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CHILDREN ARE LOSING MARYLAND'S "TENDER YEARS" 
WAR 
Lynn McLaint 
Often times, the child is the only witness. Yet age may make 
the child incompetent to testify in court .... "[W] hen the 
choice is between evidence which is less than best and no 
evidence at all, only clear folly would dictate an across-the-
board policy of doing without.'" 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What seems like Maryland's version of the Hundred Years War 
continues to be fought in the Maryland General Assembly regarding 
the "tender years exception," a limited hearsay exception for state-
ments made by children under twelve years old regarding physical 
or sexual abuse against them.2 Maryland's statute is much more re-
t Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law; J.D., Duke University 
Law School, 1974; B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1971. The author thanks 
Michael A.B. Turner for his intrepid research and editorial assistance, as well 
as Elizabeth Rhodes, Esquire for her comments on a draft of this Article. The 
author also thanks Ellen Mugmon of the Maryland Governor's Council on 
Child Abuse and Neglect for her many years of devotion to the cause of pro-
tecting and nurturing children, and for her working and sharing information 
with the author over the last decade. Many others, including Chief Judge Jo-
seph Murphy, Senator Walter Baker, State's Attorney Robert L. Dean, Deputy 
State's Attorney Sue Schenning, Assistant State's Attorney Julie prake, former 
Assistant State's Attorney Scott Shellenberger, and Dorothy Lennig, Esquire of 
the House of Ruth, are also thanked for all their efforts on behalf of abused 
children. 
1. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 943 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting FED. R EVID. 
art. VIII advisory committee's note). 
2. Maryland's tender years statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (Supp. 1997), 
amended Uy S. 688 (Md. 1998) (effective October 1, 1998), is reprinted in the 
Appendix to this Article. The amendments are clearly noted. Senate Bill 688 is 
also available in <http://mlis.state.md.us/1998rs/billfile/HB0590.htm> (visited 
April 20, 1998). 
Section 775 establishes a limited tender years exception for certain out-of-
court statements made by victims of alleged child abuse that have been 
screened by the trial judge and found to be sufficiently reliable to be admissi-
ble in evidence. Some prosecutors have complained that some trial judges will 
not admit even very reliable hearsay under Section 775. See Letter from Rob-
21 
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strictive than those of other states.3 Yet, year after year, attempts to 
liberalize it have been defeated in the Maryland House of Delegates 
Judiciary Committee, leaving Maryland's children significantly less 
protected from physical and sexual abuse than children living III 
other states. 
Prior to the adoption of the current tender years statute, in 
Deloso v. State,4 a five-year-old Maryland girl was repeatedly beaten.s 
Her father's conviction for child abuse was reversed on appeal be-
cause the trial judge admitted testimony that a young girl had told 
teachers and others that her father beat her and threw her against 
the wal1.6 If the child had run for help and was excited when she 
made the statement, it would have been admissible under the tradi-
tional hearsay exception for excited utterances.7 However, the tradi-
ert L. Dean, State's Attorney for Montgomery County, to Sandra F. Haines, Re-
porter, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 1 (Nov. 17, 
1997) (on file with author). If tender years hearsay is deemed essential to a 
prosecution, and the judge erroneously excludes it, the State has no recourse. 
See generally Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-302 (1995) (denying a right 
to appeal of a final judgment unless expressly granted by law). Allowing inter-
locutory appeals by the State from adverse pretrial evidentiary rulings would 
do much to ameliorate this situation-at least if the trial judge rules (or is re-
quired to rule) before trial. See generally, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-979(c) 
(1997); ORE. REv. STAT. 138.060(3) (1995). 
3. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1995); ALAsKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Michie 1995); ARIz. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (West 1989); ARK. R EVID. 803(25); CAL. EVID. CODE 
§ 1228 (West 1995); COLO. R EVID. § 13-25-129 (Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 11, § 3513(a) (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-16 (1995); HAW. R EVID. 
804 (b) (6); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024 (1997); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/115-10 
(West 1986 & Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-3746 (West Supp. 1994); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 232.96 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60460(dd) (Supp. 1997); 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1 (1995); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 
233, § 81 (West Supp. 1997); MICH. R EVID. 803A; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 
(West 1996); MISS. R EVID. 803(25); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075 (West 1996); 
NEV. REv. STAT. § 51.385 (1996); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 516:25-a (Supp. 1995); 
NJ. R EVID. 803(27); NY FAM. CT. Acr § 1046 (McKinney 1983); N.D. R EVID. 
803(24); OHIO R EVID. 807; OKrA STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West 1993 & 
Supp. 1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985.1 (West Supp. 1997); RI. GEN. 
LAws § 14-1-69 (1994); S.c. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-16-38 (Michie 1995); TEx. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 38.072 
(West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5411 (1995); VT. R EVID. 804a(a); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:2 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9A.44.120 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998). 
4. 37 Md. App. 101, 376 A.2d 873 (1977). 
5. See id. at 102·03, 376 A.2d at 875. 
6. See id. at 107, 376 A.2d at 877. 
7. See generally MD. RULE 5-803 (b) (2) (providing an excited utterance exception 
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tional common-law hearsay exceptions did not permit the trial 
judge to admit the statement, because the child's statement was 
quite casual. 8 Even if the judge found that the statement was ex-
tremely reliable, it would remain inadmissible under the common 
law.9 Maryland's subsequently adopted tender years exception would 
permit a judge to admit this type of statement, if found reliable, but 
only if made to a teacher, a licensed physician, a licensed psycholo-
gist, or a licensed social worker.lO A 1998 amendment, effective Oc-
tober 1, 1998, repeals the "licensed" requirement and extends the 
list of professionals to include nurses, principals, vice principals, 
and school counselors. II 
Despite legislative efforts embodied in Section 775 of Article 27, 
Maryland's children continue to lack adequate protection. Under 
current law, for example, another act of injustice occurred in a case 
involving a five-year-old Maryland girl who contracted gonorrhea. 12 
Her stepfather was tried and acquitted when the State was not per-
mitted to prove that the child had described her stepfather having 
sexual intercourse with her.13 The child made the statement to a po-
lice officer and not directly to a licensed physician, licensed psychol-
ogist, licensed social worker, or a teacher. Therefore, the statement 
could not be reviewed for reliability by the trial judge. 14 It was ruled 
inadmissible per se under Maryland's limited tender years excep-
tion.IS If the same statement had been made to a teacher, licensed 
to the rule against hearsay). 
8. See Deloso, 37 Md. App. at 107, 376 A.2d at 877. 
9. See id. 
10. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). Section 775, 
with amendments that become effective October 1, 1998, is reprinted in the 
Appendix to this Article. 
11. See H.D. 590, sec. 1, § 775(b)(2)(i) (Md. 1988) (effective October 1, 1998), 
available in <http://mlis.state.md.us/1998rs/billfile/HB0590.htm> (visited 
April 20, 1998). Section 775, with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix 
to this Article. 
The term "school counselor" is defined as a "school counselor at a public 
or private preschool, elementary school, or secondary school." H.D. 590, sec. 
1, § 775(b) (2) (i) (5). 
12. See Jackie Powder, Judge's Ban of Social Worker's Testimony in Child Abuse Case Up-
sets Investigators, THE SUN (BALT.), August 9, 1992, at 6B. 
13. See id. 
14. See id. See generally § 775. The 1998 amendments, which extended this list and 
eliminated the "licensed" requirement, see H.D. 590, sec. 1, § 775(b)(2)(i), 
would not remedy this injustice. Section 775, with amendments, is reprinted 
in the Appendix to this Article. 
15. See Powder, supra note 12, at 6B. 
24 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 27· 
physician, psychologist, or social worker in a related civil proceed-
ing for a protective order (or custody suit brought by the biological 
father), it would remain inadmissible under current Maryland law 
because the tender years exception applies only in criminal and ju-
venile cases. 16 
Repeated efforts to mainstream Maryland's tender years hearsay 
exception to parallel those of other states have been received with 
hostility bordering on hysteria. Excuses often cited for opposing 
main streaming include the following: (1) fears that many innocent 
people will be wrongly convicted of child abuse because "children 
lie," and (2) that wives will make false accusations against their chil-
dren's fathers in an effort to gain the upper hand in divorce casesY 
The hostility stems in part from the self-interests of both the Mary-
land State Teacher's Association (MSTA)-whose members do not 
want to be accused of child abuse-and the criminal defense bar-
whose members do not want their clients to be convicted-as well 
as from simple gender bias against women. 
The recurring arguments against mainstreaming Maryland's 
tender years exception are illogical. They are contemptuous of and 
degrading to women and children, and they are distrustful and dis-
respectful of both trial judges' ability to screen out unreliable hear-
say and jurors' ability to assess the credibility of hearsay that is prop-
erly admitted into evidence. 18 The opponents of liberalizing 
Maryland's tender years statute have provided no support for their 
views, either under case law or with empirical data. 
To the extent that these antagonistic views are based on reason-
able fears of false accusations, they are clearly aimed at the wrong 
target. Rules of evidence cannot prevent false or erroneous accusa-
tions. Malicious accusations of child abuse, like malicious accusa-
tions of any criminal wrongdoing, are actionable as slander, libel, or 
malicious prosecution. 19 
This Article first discusses the rationale for the tender years 
hearsay exception20 and the constitutional limits on admitting 
16. See § 775(b)(I); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting that a 
1998 amendment repealed the "licensed" requirement and added four more 
professionals to the list). 
17. See infra Part V.A-C. 
18. In the case of a bench trial, the judge's ability to decide the credibility of the 
hearsay is also questioned. 
19. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 150-51, 435 (1996 & Supp. 1997); Krashes v. 
White, 275 Md. 549, 554, 341 A.2d 798, 801 (1975). 
20. See infra notes 2~111 and accompanying text. 
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tender years hearsay.21 Next, it sets forth the history of Maryland's 
tender years statute.22 This Article then addresses each of the argu-
ments that have been made over the years by opponents of liberaliz-
ing the statute23 and compares Maryland's tender years statute to 
those of other states.24 Finally, this Article recommends specific 
amendments to Maryland's tender years statute and proposes its in-
corporation into the Maryland Rules of Evidence.25 
II. THE NEED FOR A TENDER YEARS HEARSAY EXCEPTION 
The vast majority of states have created tender years hearsay ex-
ceptions, either by statute or through specific rules of evidence.26 
Several public policy reasons support the recognition of the tender 
years exception: (1) child abuse- physical, sexual, and emotional-
is a serious, widespread problem in the United States;27 (2) young 
children are particularly helpless, and they are unable to extricate 
themselves from seriously abusive homes or other environments 
without adult assistance; (3) effective remedial action cannot be 
taken without identifying the abuser, who is usually known only to 
the child and, sometimes, to someone who colludes with or covers 
up for the abuser;28 (4) for reasons explained by developmental psy-
chology, very young children are often ruled incompetent to testify 
at trial, although they may have made reliable, concrete out-of-court 
statements at an earlier time;29 (5) even if permitted to testify at 
trial, young children are unlikely to be able to testify to an earlier 
event with the degree of memory that an adult could, and they are 
easily confused by a deft cross-examination;3o and (6) pre-existing, 
21. See infra notes 112-166 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 169-245 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 254-97 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 298-349 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra notes 351-401, 402 and accompanying text. 
26. See generally sources cited supra note 3. 
27. See Successful Suits Don't Always Improve States' Care of Abused Children, THE SUN 
(BALT.), Mar. 17, 1996, at 18A. See generally BILUE WRIGHT DZIECH & JUDGE 
CHARLES B. SCHUDSON, ON TRIAL, AMERICA'S COURTS AND THEIR TREATMENT OF 
SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN (2d ed. 1991). 
28. See, e.g., Mary Maushard, More Charges Possible in Death of 9-Year-Old, THE SUN 
(BALT.), July 13, 1997, at 2B (describing the household of a child abuse victim 
that was likely to have had one actual abuser and two colluding adults). 
29. See 1 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CAsES §§ 3.1-3.8 
(3d ed. 1997). 
30. See id. §§ 1.2, 1.3-1.7, 1.29. See generally id. §§ 6.1-6.22 (providing a comprehen-
sive explanation of children as witnesses). 
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"firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions have been inadequate to permit 
the admission of all reliable out-of-court statements made by 
children.31 
A. Serious Child Abuse and Neglect are Widespread 
As the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, 
"[ilt is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's inter-
est in 'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a 
minor' is 'compelling.' "32 The states, however, are having serious 
difficulty protecting children.33 As of March 1996, at least twenty-one 
states were under court supervision as a result of having failed to 
provide proper care for abused or neglected children.34 Physical 
abuse and sexual abuse are both widespread. A news article from 
March 1996 reported: "Surveys by the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services show the annual number of abused or ne-
glected children has more than doubled in the past decade, to 2.9 
million from 1.4 million. The number seriously injured by 
abuse ... has quadrupled, to 572,000 from 143,000."35 
A federal advisory panel concluded, after a two-and-one-half-
year study, that the "vast m~ority of [physically] abused and ne-
glected children are under four years old. "36 At least two thousand 
children are killed by abuse and neglect each year in the United 
States, "outstripping deaths caused by accidental falls, choking on 
food, suffocation, drowning or residential fires."37 
In late 1995, a Gallup poll asked parents to report on their own 
disciplinary acts of physical abuse and their knowledge of any sexual 
31. See infra Part IlLB.1. 
32. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747, 756-58 (1982) (citations omitted»; accord Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 
836, 852 (1990) (recognizing that "a state's interest in 'the protection of mi-
nor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment' is a 'com-
pelling' one"). 
33. See Successful Suits Don't Always Improve States' Care of Alntsed Children, THE SUN 
(BALT.), Mar. 17, 1996, at 18A. 
34. See id. 
35. Id.; see also Andrea J. Sedlak, Ph.D. & Diane D. Broadhurst, M.L.A., Executive 
Summary of U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THIRD NATIONAL INCI-
DENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1996). Even intentional starvation 
has occurred. See Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan, Principal Recalls Bruises on Child, THE 
SUN (BALT.), July 14, 1997, at lB. 
36. Child Alntse Has Reached Crisis Proportions in U.S., Advisory Board Finds, THE SUN 
(BALT.), Apr. 26, 1995, at 24A. ' 
37. Id. 
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abuse inflicted upon their children.38 Physical abuse was defined as 
including punching, kicking, throwing the child down, and hitting 
the child with a hard object somewhere other than on the but-
tocks.39 This definition was limited so as to not include spanking, 
slapping, shouting, cursing, or threatening to send the child away.40 
Based on those results, the Gallup organization estimated that more 
than three million American children are physically abused annu-
ally.41 Generally, more mothers than fathers reported physically 
abusing their children.42 The Gallup poll also suggested that 1.3 mil-
lion American children are sexually abused.43 
In 1996, Maryland had 29,778 reported cases of child abuse.44 
Prince George's County accounted for 3,043 of those cases; of that 
number, 546 cases involved sexual abuse.45 In Baltimore City, there 
were 8,441 reported cases of abuse, including 824 investigations of 
sexual abuse.46 
Abuse of children occurs most often in the fcimily home.47 The 
facts of various Maryland appellate cases, for example, describe a 
range of abuse-at-home scenarios, including a three-and-one-half-
year-old child's lacerated internal organs, extensive bruising, and in-
ternal bleeding.48 Because child abuse is such an unpleasant topic, 
38. See 2 Suroeys Find Grim News for Children, THE SUN (BALT.). Dec. 7, 1995, at 4A. 
39. See id. 
40. See id. 
41. See id. 
42. See id. 
43. See id. 
44. See REpORT OF MARYLAND'S CHILD PROTECITVE SERVICES (1996) (report on file 
with author). 
45. See id. 
46. See id. 
47. See United States v. Babe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1446 (10th Cir. 1997); Veronica Ser-
rato, Note, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Spectrum of Uses, 
68 B.U. L. REv. 155, 158 (1988). 
48. See Moore v. State, 26 Md. App. 556, 557-59, 338 A.2d 344, 345-46 (1975) 
(holding that a three-and-one-half-year-old child's statement in an emergency 
room that "Daddy [stepfather or mother's boyfriend] did it," made within 
hours after infliction of injuries, was properly admitted as an excited utter-
ance); see also Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 6-7, 50, 536 A.2d 666, 668-69, 
690 (1988) (finding that it was reversible error to admit a two-and-one-half-
year-old child's responses, "Daddy [her mother's boyfriend]" did it, when 
asked by a physician examining extensive bruising on her arms, legs, and but-
tocks, and irritation to her genital area, "Who did this?" because they were 
neither excited utterances nor was it known whether the child believed she 
was making statements to assist in her medical treatment); In re Rachel T., 77 
28 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 27 
people naturally tend to employ the defense mechanism of denial 
and think that it does not happen. However, studies show other-
wise. "Most abusers reside in the child's home, most frequently the 
father (14%), stepfather (12%), boyfriend of the mother (13 %), or 
other relative (older brother, uncle, grandfather) (14%)."49 
When sexual abuse occurs, a young child may not know, or 
may know only on some intuitive level, that what is happening is 
wrong and uncomfortable. In either case, the child may feel unsure 
and hesitant about breaking a promise to the abuser by telling the 
"secret," or may be intimidated into remaining silent by the 
abuser's threats. 50 An older child who knows that the sexual activity 
should not be happening may have guilty feelings mixed with fear. 
As a result, the child is likely either not to report or to delay repoit-
ing the abuse.51 
The clues to detecting abuse in children of any age are abnor-
mal behavior on the part of the child, including "acting out, "52 en-
gaging in precocious sexual activity,53 or withdrawing from a normal 
touch, such as a pat on the shoulder by a babysitter or a teacher. 54 
In some cases, there may be physical evidence of abuse that a care-
taker might notice (for example, at bath time).55 However, the phys-
ical evidence of abuse might not be discovered until a medical ex-
amination is performed.56 Additionally, sexually abused children are 
Md. App. 20, 34-37, 549 A.2d 27, 34-36 (1988) (finding that a four-and-one-
half-year-old child's statements to a social worker, who was member of a pedi-
atric gynecology specialist's treatment team, when the child had been bleed-
ing from her vagina and rectum and knew that her statements would be used 
to provide treatment, were properly admitted in a Child in Need of Assistance 
(CINA) hearing under the hearsay exception for statements made for the pur-
pose of obtaining medical treatment; the child said that she had a "secret 
with her Dad" and that her father said "she was going to cry a lot if she told"; 
the child depicted intercourse between a girl doll and a "Daddy" doll, calling 
the doll's penis a "tutor"). 
49. Theodore P. Cross et aI., Criminal Justice Outcomes of Prosecution of Child Sexual 
Abuse: A Case Flow Analysis, 19 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1432, 144142 (1995). 
50. See Serrato, supra note 47, at 157-61. 
51. See id. at 158-61; Ann Marie Hagen, Note, Tolling the Statute of Limitations for 
Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 76 IOWA L. REv. 355, 359 & n.30 
(1991). 
52. See MYERS, supra note 29, § 5.3, at 421. 
53. See id. at § 5.3, at 422-23; see also, e.g., Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d 1071, 1086 
(7th Cir. 1992). 
54. See MYERS, supra note 29, § 5.3, at 422. 
55. See id. § 4.5. 
56. See id. 
o 
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often aware of bodily functions they should not be aware of and use 
inappropriate language when describing their experiences.57 
Child abuse exacts a high price on our children and our soci-
ety in many ways. 58 The long term effects on maltreated children in-
clude "delinquency, pregnancy, alcohol and drug abuse, school fail-
ure, and emotional and mental health problems."59 
B. Difficulty in Identifying the Abuser 
"Child abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and 
prosecute, in large part because there are often no witnesses except 
for the victim."60 The child's out-of-court statement is often essential 
to identifying the abuser. Without convincing proof of who commit-
ted the abuse, the State is helpless to protect the child and prose-
cute the child's abuser.61 Unless either the abused child or the 
abuser is removed, the abuse may continue with impunity. The the-
ory behind the tender years hearsay exception is that young chil-
dren's out-of-court statements regarding child abuse that contain 
sufficient indicia of reliability ought to be admitted into evidence 
and considered by the fact finder, even if they do not fall within the 
firmly rooted, common-law hearsay exceptions.62 
C. Inadequacy of Other Hearsay Exceptions 
The firmly rooted, common-law hearsay exceptions that were 
recognized in Maryland when the first tender years statute was 
adopted in 1988, and the additional exceptions codified in the Ma-
ryland Rules of Evidence, effective July 1, 1994, are inadequate to ad-
dress the problem that the tender years exception was intended to 
combat.63 
57. See id. § 1.17. 
58. See, e.g., id. § 4.1, at 294-96, §§ 5.2-5.3, at 413-17. 
59. Barbara Tatem Kelley et ai., In the Wake of Childhood Maltreatment, JUV. JUST. 
BULL., Aug. 1997, at 2; see also, SexuaUy Abused Teen-Agers Face Tougher Road, THE 
SUN (BALT.), Oct. 1, 1997, at 5A; Youth Offenders Sent Away, Only to Return, THE 
SUN (BALT.). Sept. 29, 1997, at 1A. 
60. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
61. See Powder, supra note 12, at 6B. 
62. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). Section 775 is 
reprinted in the Appendix to this Article. 
63. See infra notes 64-94 and accompanying text. 
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1. The Common-Law Hearsay Exceptions Now Codified in the Ma-
ryland Rules of Evidence 
The following four common-law hearsay exceptions are codified 
in the Maryland Rules of Evidence .. 
a. Statements Made in Order to Obtain Medical Treatment 
A patient's out-of-court statements to a treating physician (or 
another person from whom one seeks medical treatment) are ad-
missible in evidence to the extent that they relate to facts relevant 
to treatment, regardless whether the patient is available to testify.64 
The out-of-court statements are admissible whether or not the pa-
tien t testifies at the trial. 65 
The circumstantial guarantee of reliability is found in the pa-
tient's self-interest in obtaining proper treatment.66 This self-interest 
is thought to override any motive for insincerity.67 If a child, seeking 
treatment, complains to a doctor or nurse that he has been injured 
in a particular way by a particular person, the doctor may testify at 
trial to the physical ac.ts described by the child.68 The child need 
not be found competent to testify at trial.69 
However, Maryland case law is unsettled regarding whether the 
doctor may testify to the child's identification of the assailant.70 The 
64. See MD. RULE 5-803 (b) (4); JOSEPH F. MuRPHY, JR, MARYLAND EVIDENCE HAND-
BOOK § 803(E) (2) (2d ed. 1993); see also, e.g., Shirks Motor Express v. Ox-
enham, 204 Md. 626, 635-36, 106 A.2d 46, 49-50 (1954). 
65. See MD. RULE 5-803(b)(4). 
66. See Yellow Cab Co. v. Henderson, 183 Md. 546, 551-54, 39 A.2d 546, 550-51 
(1944) (admitting a statement where the declarant was the mother of the 
three-year-old patient). Thus, "[ t] he Maryland cases recognize that there is an 
equal circumstantial guarantee of sincerity when one seeks treatment for one-
self or for a loved one." LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 255 
(1994); see, e.g., Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 29-30, 536 A.2d 666, 675 
(1988) (finding the sincerity motive to be lacking). 
67. See supra note 66. 
68. See FED. R EVID. 803(4). The advisory committee note provides: "Under the 
exception the statement need not have been made to a physician. Statements 
to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or even members of the family 
might be included." Id. advisory committee's note, at n.4. 
69. See infra notes 120-64 and accompanying text. 
70. Compare Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 30, 536 A.2d at 680 (stating that the identity 
of the person who inflicted the bruises is not ordinarily of medical impor-
tance), with In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 36, 549 A.2d 27, 35 (1988) (stat-
ing that the child's statements implicating her father as her abuser were ad-
missible under the treating physician exception). See generally 6 LYNN McLAIN, 
MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL § 803.1 (4) & nn.4-6 (1987 & Supp. 
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disagreement centers around the relevance of the child's identifica-
tion of the assailant to the medical treatment. 71 Courts in some 
other jurisdictions have admitted the child's identification of the 
abuser as relevant to the physician's proposed course of treatment, 
particularly when the alleged abuser lives with the child.72 Mary-
land's current tender years exception would allow such statements if 
found to be reliable, but only if made to a physician, psychologist, 
nurse, social worker, teacher, principal, vice principal, or school 
counselor.73 
b. Excited Utterances 
A child's out-of-court statement will be admissible as an excited 
utterance if it was made spontaneously while the child remained 
under continuing stress from a startling event, regardless whether 
the child is available to testify.74 It does not matter whether the 
child testifies or whether the child is available to testify.75 Addition-
ally, the child does not have to be competent to testify at trial in or-
der for the statement to be admitted.76 
The theory of the reliability of an excited utterance is that the 
continuing stress of the event stills the declarant's ability to fabri-
cate.?7 If, for example, a child escaped from his attacker and ran to 
a police officer on the corner and blurted out what had happened, 
the police officer could testify to the child's statement.?8 
1995). For federal cases, see id. § 803.2(4) & n.6. See also Moore v. State, 26 
Md. App. 556, 559-67, 338 A.2d 344, 345-50 (1975) (admitting an out-of-court 
statement by a three-and-one-half-year-old child to a physician, made within 
hours after the alleged beating, that "Daddy was mad, Daddy did it," but ad-
mitting it under the hearsay exception for excited utterances). 
71. See supra note 70. 
72. See, e.g., United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 438 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding 
statements that a five-year-old boy, who testified at trial, had made to social 
workers were properly admitted under both FED. R EvlD. 803(4) and FED. R 
EVID. 803(24»; State v. Smith, 337 S.E.2d 833, 83940 (N.C. 1985) (finding 
four- and five-year-old girls' statements to their grandmother, resulting in 
their getting subsequent medical treatment, were properly admitted under the 
medical treatment exception). 
73. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). Section 775, 
with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix to this Article. 
74. See MD. RULE 5-803 (b) (2); see also MuRPHY. supra note 64, § 803(C). 
75. See, e.g., Moore, 26 Md. App. at 562, 338 A.2d at 347. 
76. See infra notes 120-64 and accompanying text. 
77. See, e.g., Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692, 697, 452 A.2d 661, 664 (1982). 
78. See Sears v. State, 9 Md. App. 375, 383-84, 264 A.2d 485, 488-89 (1970) (finding 
a police officer's testimony to statements within one-half hour of assault, made 
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This exception, however, does not apply when a child's reports 
of abuse are not spontaneous, but instead are in response to ques-
tioning.79 An excited utterance must be made while the child is 
under such continuing stress as to preclude his conscious thinking 
and functioning. 80 However, in many cases the child may have been 
intimidated by his abuser not to tell anyone, may feel guilty about 
revealing the identity of the abuser, or may repress the experi-
ence.81 For these reasons, the child may not tell anyone until some-
one notices a change in the child's physical condition or behavior 
and questions the child about it, or until the threat of repeated 
abuse is imminent.82 In these situations, the child's statement re-
garding the earlier abuse will not quality as an excited utterance.83 
For example, in Harnish v. State,84 the mother of the alleged 
child abuse victim testified that when the defendant, a neighbor, 
came over to the child's house and asked the mother to allow the 
five-year-old child to visit him, the child told her about sexual abuse 
by the neighbor that had occurred eleven days earlier.85 The neigh-
bor's conviction was reversed by the Court of Special Appeals of Ma-
ryland on the ground that the child's statement to his mother was 
inadmissible as an excited utterance.86 Even under Maryland's cur-
rent tender years exception, the mother would be unable to testifY 
to her child's statement. This case demonstrates that Maryland can-
not fulfill its compelling interest in protecting children under the 
present state of the law.87 
by an eleven-year-old victim after she fled to the police station, was properly 
admitted); see also Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 581, 588, 252 A.2d 277, 281 
(1969) (finding a four-year-old girl's out-of-court statement to her mother, 
four to five hours after rape, but her first words spoken during that time, was 
properly admitted). 
79. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 826 (1990); Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. 
App. 1, 22, 536 A.2d 666, 676 (1988). 
80. See MD. RULE 5-803 (b) (2); Mouzone, 294 Md. at 697, 452 A.2d at 664. 
81. See Judy \Un, Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex 
Almse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1745, 1756-57 (1983); Darren J. LaMarca, Note, 
Evidence - Sexual Almse of Children: The justification for a New Hearsay Exception, 
5 MISS. C. L. REv. 177, 180 (1985). 
82. See \Un, supra note 81, at 180; supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text. 
83. See Deloso v. State, 37 Md. App. 101, 102·-07, 376 A.2d 873, 875-77 (1977) (find-
ing it reversible error to admit proof of a five-year-old girl's "quite casual" 
complaints of beatings by her father). 
84. 9 Md. App. 546,266 A.2d 364 (1970). 
85. See id. at 548, 266 A.2d at 364. 
86. See id. at 551-52, 266 A.2d at 366-67. 
87. See generally Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990). 
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c. Prompt Reports of Sexual Assault 
Maryland recognizes a hearsay exception for a victim's prompt 
report of rape or other sexual assault.88 The report is admissible to 
corroborate the victim's testimony as long as the victim is present at 
trial and available for cross-examination.89 For a variety of reasons, 
however, children often may not make prompt reports.90 Moreover, 
a very young victim frequently is not available for cross-examination 
at trial because the judge has found the child incompetent to tes-
tify.91 In either event, this hearsay exception would be inapplicable 
and highlights the need for a tender years exception that more fully 
protects children. 
d. Dying Declarations 
The statement of a fourteen-year-old girl, as she threw herself 
in front of a train, shouting that "she was taking her life because of 
anguish over early morning sexual assaults by her father," was ad-
mitted as evidence in a Virginia trial of the girl's father for aggra-
vated sexual battery.92 Under Maryland's common-law hearsay excep-
88. See MD. RULE 5-802.1 (d); see also MuRPHY, supra note 64, § 801(D). 
89. See, e.g., State v. Werner, 302 Md. 550, 563, 489 A.2d 1119, 1125-26 (1985). 
90. See, e.g., Harnish, 9 Md. App. at 551, 266 A.2d at366 (stating that the child dis--
closed the incident of abuse to his mother eleven days after it happened); see 
also Cole v. State, 83 Md. App. 279, 302, 305, 574 A.2d 326, 337, 339 (1990) 
(finding it reversible error to admit, in the State's rebuttal, evidence of a ten-
year-old victim's complaints to her babysitter and to a police officer that did 
not qualify under the common-law exceptions as either timely complaints of 
sexual attack or as prior consistent statements admissible to rehabilitate the 
witness's credibility; nor did the statements qualify under MD. CODE ANN., Crs. 
& JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1 (Supp. 1989) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE, art. 
27, § 775 (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998», because they were not made to a li-
censed physician, a licensed psychologist, a licensed social worker, or a 
teacher). 
91. For example, a child sexual abuse prosecution against Jamal Craig, the teen-
age son of the operator of the Craig Country Preschool in Howard County, 
Maryland, was dismissed in the summer of 1987 when the trial judge found 
the seven-year-old alleged victim incompetent to testify because she had no 
memory at the time of trial of the alleged abuse. See Michael J. Clark, Craig 
Witness Said to Identify Other Abusers, THE SUN (BALT.), Aug. 25, 1987, at 2D; 
Michael J. Clark, Howard Prosecutors Drop One Abuse Case Against Craig Youth; 
Other Cases Remain, THE SUN (BALT.), July 29, 1987, at ID. 
92. John F. Harris, Father Guilty of Molesting Va. Teen-Ager, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 
1986, at C1. Either the dying declaration exception or the excited utterance 
exception may have been the avenue by which the trial court admitted that 
statement. See generally Hall v. Commonwealth, 403 S.E.2d 362, 366 (Va. 1991) 
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tion for dying declarations, a child victim's statement describing a 
life-threatening attack and identifYing the attacker would be admissi-
ble if the child made the statement under the belief that death was 
imminent.93 This exception, however, is available only if the child is 
unavailable to testify, and it is limited to civil cases and to criminal 
cases of homicide, attempted homicide, and assault with intent to 
commit homicide.94 Therefore, the statements made by the sexually 
abused daughter in the Virginia case would be inadmissible in Ma-
ryland under the dying declarations hearsay exception.95 
These four firmly rooted, common-law hearsay exceptions are 
inadequate to provide the blanket protection that the proposed 
tender years exception affords. Although there are alternative ave-
nues to pursue when attempting to admit hearsay statements, the 
explanations below demonstrate that they are equally inadequate. 
2. Other Exceptions Codified in the Maryland Rules of Evidence 
The following four additional hearsay exceptions, codified in 
the Maryland Rules of Evidence, could apply to some out-of-court 
statements made by abused children. 
a. If the Child Testifies at Trial and is Subject to Cross-Examination Con-
cerning the Statement 
Under Maryland Rule 5-802.1, if a young child testifies at trial 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning his out-of-court state-
ments, the child's out-of-court statements could be admissible as 
substantive evidence if they fall within one of the following three 
categories:96 (1) prior inconsistent statements of a recanting wit-
ness,97 but only if the statements were recorded electronically; or 
were made at a grand jury proceeding, deposition, or other trial; or 
are in writing and signed by the child;98 (2) prior statements consis-
tent with the child's trial testimony, if the child has been im-
peached by the suggestion of improper influence, motive, or 
fabrication, but only if the prior statements predate the suggested 
(dying declaration); Braxton v. Commonwealth, 493 S.E.2d 688, 691 (Va. 1997) 
(excited utterance). 
93. See MD. RULE 5-804 (b) (2); MuRPHY. supra note 64, § 802(C). 
94. See MD. RULE 5-804 (b) (2). 
95. See id. 
96. See MCLAIN. SUPRA note 66, § 2.802.1 (4) (a). 
97. See Serrato, supra note 47, at 162 (discussing reasons why child witnesses re-
cant their allegations of abuse). 
98. See MD. RULE 5-802.1 (a); McLAIN, supra note 66, at 414-15. 
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improper motive or alleged fabrication;99 and (3) a prior identifica-
tion of a person after perceiving the person (for example, in a line-
Up).100 
.b. The Residual Exceptions 
In addition to the above three exceptions, if the child is un-
available to testify at the trial, Maryland Rule 5-804 (b) (5) recognizes 
a "catch-all," residual hearsay exception. 101 However, the residual 
hearsay exception will only apply "[ ul nder exceptional circum-
stances" when the statements involved have "circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness,"I02 equivalent to the specific hearsay excep-
tions in· Maryland Rule 5-804 (b) .103 Maryland Rule 5-803 (b) (24) 
similarly provides a residual exception for sufficiently reliable hear-
say, whether or not the child is available to testify.l04 
A number of other state I05 and federal courtslO6 have relied on 
99. See MD. RULE 5-802.1(b); see also Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 
(1995) (holding that the statements of the alleged child abuse victim were 
inadmissible) . 
100. See MD. RULE 5-802.1 (c); MCLAIN, supra note 66, § 2.802.1(4) (e). 
101. See MD. RULE 5-804(b) (5). 
102. Id. 
103. See MD. RULE 5-804(b). 
104. See MD. RULE 5-803 (b) (24). 
105. See, e.g., Bertrang v. State, 184 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Wis. 1971) (holding that the 
out-of-court statements made by a nine-year-old, sexually abused girl to her 
mother were admissible; the court looked at "the age of the child, the nature 
of the assault, physical evidence of such assault, relationship of the child to 
the defendant, contemporaneity and spontaneity of the assertions in relation 
to the alleged assault, reliability of the assertions themselves, and the reliabil-
ity of the testifying witness"); see also Oldsen v. People, 732 P.2d 1132, 1135-37 
(Colo. 1986) (holding that the lower court erred in admitting a five-year-old 
child's out-of-court statements to a school psychologist, physician, and social 
worker under COLO. R EVID. 803(4) (medical diagnosis or treatment excep-
tion), but the majority of the appellate court affirmed on the ground that the 
statements were admissible under COLO. R EVID. 803(24) (residual excep-
tion». The dissenting opinion found an inadequate record to support admis-
sibility under COLO. R EVID. 803 (24). See id. at 1139; see also State v. McCaf-
ferty, 356 N.W.2d 159, 161-65 (S.D. 1984) (remanding for the determination of 
whether a statement that did not qualify as an excited utterance or a present 
sense impression fell within South Dakota's residual exception when a child 
took the stand but could not testify meaningfully). 
106. See, e.g., United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 438 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding 
statements that a five-year-old boy, who testified at trial, made to social work-
ers were properly admitted under FED. R EVID. 803(4) (medical diagnosis or 
treatment exception) and FED. R EVID. 803(24) (residual exception»; United 
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similar residual exceptions to admit tender years statements. How-
ever, in State v. Walker,107 the Court of Appeals of Maryland narrowly 
construed Maryland's residual hearsay exceptions, opining that it 
would apply them only in unprecedented situations. !Os Judge Wilner, 
writing for the majority, stated that the proponent of the hearsay 
"must show an exceptional circumstance, not anticipated when the 
rule was adopted." 109 
Tender years statements and Maryland's statute were well 
known when the catch-all rules were adopted in 1994.llo The Walker 
court strongly suggested that the specific tender years statute is 
likely to be read by the court of appeals as establishing the limits 
for the admissibility of reliable tender years hearsay and precluding 
the trial court's admission of other reliable tender years hearsay 
under a catch-all exception. lll In any event, a specific tender years 
exception, rather than reliance on the catch-all, has the advantage 
of giving more detailed guidance to trial courts than do the residual 
exceptions. 
States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1443-44 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that when a 
five-year-old girl testified at trial, but "because of her age and obvious fright," 
she did not testify meaningfully, her reliable out-of-court statement to her 
emergency foster mother, that was made during a third interview on the sub-
ject, was properly admitted under FED. R EVID. 803 (24». 
107. 345 Md. 293, 691 A.2d 1341 (1997) (Chasanow, j., dissenting). 
108. See id. at 329, 691 A.2d at 1359. 
109. [d. 
110. The General Assembly has the power to enact statutes allowing for the admis-
sion of hearsay. See MD. RULE 5-802 ("Except as otherwise provided by these 
rules or permitted by applicable constitutional provisions or statutes, hearsay is 
not admissible." (emphasis added». 
Proposed MD. RULE 5-802.2 would have specifically incorporated the 
tender years statute by reference. At a hearing held by the court of appeals on 
the Proposed Rules, in response to questioning by the court, this author testi-
fied that there was no need to single out one statute for specific incorporation 
into the rules because MD. RULE 5-802 covered the situation; Proposed MD. 
RULE 5-802.2 could be read as intending a different effect as to other hearsay 
statutes, and it could necessitate amending the rules when the Maryland Gen-
eral Assembly amended the tender years statute (as it subsequently has done). 
Thus, the court's non-adoption of Proposed MD. RULE 5-802.2 ought not be 
seen as evidencing any disapproval of the tender years exception. 
111. See generally State v. Walker, 345 Md. 293, 691 A.2d 1341 (1997) (Chasanow, J., 
dissenting) . 
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III. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW ON THE CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE 
The federal 1l2 and Maryland1l3 confrontation clauses-the right 
of the accused to be confronted with opposing witnesses-apply 
only in criminal cases. 114 The due process clauses1l5 reflect the same 
concern by precluding the reliance on unreliable hearsay in civil 
cases. 1I6 This section of the Article will address the limits, as estab-
lished by Supreme Court case law, that an accused's confrontation 
right places upon admitting hearsay statements. 
A. If the Out-of Court Declarant Testifies at Trial and is Subject to Cross-
Examination 
No conflict with an accused's confrontation right arises if the 
out-of-court statement of a witness who testifies at trial is admitted 
against the accused, as long as the accused has the opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness concerning the statement. 117 Therefore, 
112. See U.S. CaNST. amend. VI. 
113. See MD. CaNST. art. 21. 
114. See 1 MYERS, supra note 29, § 7.63. 
115. See U.S. CaNST. amend. VI; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567-69 (1974); 
MYERS, supra note 29, § 7.63; see also MD. CaNST. art. 21; if. United States v. 
Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 847 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a video conference pro- . 
cedure for a civil commitment hearing does not violate due process). 
116. See Kade v. Charles H. Hickey Sch., 80 Md. App. 721, 728, 566 A.2d 148, 152 
(1989) (reversing an administrative agency's decision that was based on unreli-
able hearsay). 
117. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 556 (1988) (finding no error in ad-
mitting prior identification by victim witness, who, because of memory loss, 
could not explain the basis for the identification); California v. Green, 399 
U.S. 149, 153 (1970) (finding no error in admitting prior testimony of a prose-
cution witness who was subject to full cross-examination at trial); United States 
v. Grooms, 978 F.2d 425, 426-28 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that the trial court 
properly admitted, under FED. R EVID. 803(24) (residual exception), child vic-
tims' out-of-court statements made to F.B.I. agents that were more detailed 
than victims' in-court testimony; no violation of the Confrontation Clause oc-
curred because the children were subject to extensive cross-examination, al-
beit limited by their lack of memory); if. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 
(1990) (upholding the constitutionality of MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRac. 
§ 9-102 (1989) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 774 (Supp. 
1997) », that permits child witnesses for the prosecution to testify over closed-
circuit television at trial if the court finds that testifying in the presence of the 
accused child abuser would cause a child witness "serious emotional distress 
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate"), on remand sub nom., 
Craig v. State, 322 Md. 418, 428-34, 588 A.2d 328, 333-36 (1991) (reversing the 
conviction on statutory grounds for an inadequate finding of necessity to use 
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the confrontation clauses are not offended when tender years hear-
say of a child who testifies at trial is admitted. 
However, as Judge Murnaghan of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained, the United States Su-
preme Court's case law "teaches that, where there are circumstances 
assuring the accuracy of hearsay, cross-examination is not [required 
or] talismanic of constitutional guarantees."118 Reliable hearsay, 
therefore, may be admitted if the out-of-court declarant is either un-
able to testify at trial or is available to testify, but does not do so.ll9 
B. Hearsay Admissible Even When the Declarant Does Not Testify at Trial 
The Supreme Court, in its 1980 decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 120 
made clear that even if declarants are unavailable to testify at trial, 
the admission of their out-of-court statements will not violate the 
defendant's confrontation right if the hearsay statements either (1) 
fall within well-established, historical hearsay exceptions, or (2) are 
otherwise necessary and reliable-that is, they bear "particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness." 121 In Roberts, the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of admitting evidence against the accused under 
the firmly rooted hearsay exception for prior testimony of a witness 
unavailable at trial. 122 
1. The Rule Against Hearsay Has "Firmly Rooted" Exceptions 
Subsequent to the Roberts decision, the Supreme Court has up-
held the constitutionality of admitting hearsay evidence against the 
accused that fell within the firmly rooted exceptions: (1) statements 
by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, 123 
a closed-circuit because the trial judge failed to look into the possibility of a 
two-way, rather than a one-way, closed-circuit television). 
118. Ellison v. Sachs, 769 F.2d 955, 957 (4th Cir. 1985). 
119. See generally id. 
120. 448 u.S. 56 (1980). 
121. [d. at 66 ("Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evi-
dence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evi-
dence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness." (emphasis added». 
122. See id. at 77; see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
123. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1987) (finding no error in 
admitting a statement when the declarant was unavailable to testify); United 
States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (holding that a showing that the declarant 
is unavailable to testify is not required); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 259. 
Uohn William Strong et al., eds., 4th ed. 1992) (explaining the significance of 
representative admissions and co-conspirator statements). 
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(2) excited utterances,l24 and (3) statements made to a physician for 
purposes of obtaining proper medical treatment. l25 
As to each of these three categories, the Supreme Court has 
held that the foundation supporting the' finding that the firmly 
rooted hearsay exception applies is sufficient to show the degree of 
reliability mandated by the Confrontation Clause. 126 
The Court has suggested that because the out-of-court state-
ment may be more reliable than the declarant's in-court testimony 
would be, the circumstances supporting the reliability of the out-of-
court statements-the furtherance of the conspiracy, the stress of 
the event, or the need for medical treatment-cannot be duplicated 
in court. 127 
2. The Constitution Does Not Require the Child's Testimony at 
Trial or a Showing of Unavailability When the Out-of-Court State-
ment is Sufficiently Reliable 
Of the Supreme Court hearsay cases to date, only two have in-
volved child abuse. In White v. Illinois,128 the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the admission of a four-year-old child's out-of-court 
statements regarding sexual assault, choking, and threatening by 
her mother's friend in the child's bedroom.129 At trial, the child-
victim was brought to the witness stand several times, but she was 
too upset to testifY.l30 There was no showing made that she would 
124. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992). Unavailability of the declar-
ant to testify need not be shown, nor need the declarant be produced at trial. 
See id. 
125. See id.; Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 946-47 n.9, 949-50 (4th Cir. 1988). 
Unavailability of the declarant to testify need not be shown, nor need the de-
clarant be produced at trial. See White, 502 U.S. at 356-57. 
126. See White, 502 U.S. at 356. 
127. See id. at 354-56 (" [T]he evidentiary rationale for permitting hearsay testimony 
regarding spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course of re-
ceiving medical care is that such out-of-court declarations are made in con-
texts that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness. But those 
same factors that contribute to the statements' reliability cannot be recaptured 
even by later in-court testimony."). 
128. 502 U.S. 346 (1992). 
129. See id. at 358. 
130. See id. at 349. The Supreme Court's opinion states: 
S.G. [the victim] never testified at petitioner's trial. The State at-
tempted on two occasions to call her as a witness, but she apparently 
experienced emotional difficulty on being brought to the courtroom 
and in each instance left without testifying. App. 14. The defense 
made no attempt to call S.G. as a witness, and the trial court neither 
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have been competent to testify. The trial court admitted the testi-
mony of five witnesses. 131 The first group consisted of the child's 
baby-sitter, the child's mother, and a police officer; the second 
group was an emergency room nurse and a physician. 132 The Court 
considered the child's out-of-court statements to the first group 
under the spontaneous declaration hearsay exception and those 
spoken to the second group under the medical examination hearsay 
exception. 133 
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the defendant's 
conviction was constitutionally obtained. 134 The Court found that 
the out-of-court statements were sufficiently reliable; therefore, the 
defendant's confrontation right had not been violated. 135 The Court 
explained that the unavailability of the declarant to testify at trial 
did not have to be shown, nor did the declarant have to be pro-
duced at trial. I36 The Chief Justice, writing for the Court, stated: 
We therefore think it clear that the out-of-court statements 
admitted in this case had substantial probative value, value 
that could not be duplicated simply by the declarant later 
testifying in court. To exclude such probative statements 
under the strictures of the Confrontation Clause would be 
the height of wrongheadedness, given that the Confronta-
tion Clause has as a basic purpose "the promotion of the 
"integrity of the factfinding process."137 
made, nor was asked to make, a finding that S.C. was unavailable to 
testifY. 
Id. at 350. 
131. See id. at 350-51. 
132. See id. 
133. See id. 
134. See id. at 356-57. 
135. See id. 
136. See id. 
137. Id. (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988) (quoting Kentucky v. 
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987»); see also Larson v. Nutt, 34 F.3d 647 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (finding that three-year-old declarant's availability and 
ability to testify at trial was irrelevant for purposes of Confrontation Clause 
analysis; admission of declarant's out-of-court statement was found to have par-
ticular guarantees of trustworthiness and, thus, did not violate the defendant's 
confrontation right); McCafferty v. Leapley, 944 F.2d 445, 454 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(finding that there was no denial of the defendant's confrontation right when 
the court admitted the sexually abused child's hearsay statements). 
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3. Sufficiently Reliable Hearsay That Does Not Fall Within A 
"Firmly Rooted" Hearsay Exception 
The Constitution does not require that the out-of-court declar-
ant is competent to testify at trial, but precludes the consideration 
of corroborative evidence to show reliability.138 When, as under a 
tender years exception, the hearsay admitted against an accused 
does not fall within a firmly rooted exception, the Supreme Court 
has held that particularized guarantees of trustworthiness must be 
shown. '39 In Idaho v. Wright,'40 a child's out-of-court statement was 
admitted under a residual hearsay exception. 141 The residual excep-
tion is a general catch-all for other sufficiently reliable hearsay; 
whether particular evidence meets its criteria must be determined 
on a case-by-case basis. 
In an opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, the Wright Court 
held that the requisite "'particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness' must be shown from the totality of the circumstances."'42 How-
ever, in a five-ta-four decision on this issue, the Court forbade the 
consideration of corroborating evidence, including the older sister's 
testimony.143 In doing so, the majority stated that "we think the rele-
vant circumstances include only those that surround the making of 
138. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 824 (1990). 
139. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 57 (1980). 
140. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
141. See id. at 817 (admitting an out-of-court statement under Idaho's residual hear-
say exception (similar to MD. RULE 5-803 (b) (24»). Justice O'Connor, writing 
for the Court, explained: 
In Roberts, we suggested that the "indicia of reliability" requirement 
could be met in either of two circumstances: where the hearsay state-
ment "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception," or where it is 
supported by "a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness." 448 U.S., at 66; see also Bourjaily, [483 U.S.] at 183 (" [T] he co-
conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is firmly enough rooted in 
our jurisprudence that, under this Court's holding in Roberts, a court 
need not independently inquire into the reliability of such state-
ments"); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986) ("[E]ven if certain 
hearsay evidence does not fall within 'a firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion' and is thus presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Con-
frontation Clause purposes, it may nonetheless meet Confrontation 
Clause reliability standards if it is supported by a 'showing of particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness''') (footnote and citation 
omitted). 
Wright, 497 U.S. at 816-17 (alterations in original). 
142. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 816-17. 
143. See id. 
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the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of 
belief." 144 
In Wright, a divorced mother and her live-in boyfriend (whom 
her children called "Daddy") were both convicted of sexual abuse 
of the woman's daughters, who were two-and-one-half and five-and-
one-half-years old at the time the crimes were charged. 14s The alle-
gations surfaced when the older daughter told her father's girl-
friend that the girls' mother had held her down and covered her 
mouth while the boyfriend had sexual intercourse with her, and 
that she had seen them do the same thing to the younger sister. 146 
The father's girlfriend called the police and took the older girl 
to the hospital, where an examination revealed evidence of sexual 
abuse. 147 The next day, an examination of the younger girl revealed 
"conditions 'strongly suggestive of ... vaginal contact,' occurring 
approximately two to three days" earlier. 148 
At trial, the examining physician testified to the younger 
daughter's statements that were made to him during the examina-
tion, identifYing the mother's boyfriend as the abuser.149 Both the 
mother and the boyfriend were convicted of lewd conduct with a 
minor under sixteen. ISO Only the mother appealed on the Confron-
tation Clause ground, and she appealed only from the conviction 
regarding the younger daughter. 151 
The Court assumed that the two-and-one-half-year-old daughter 
144. Id. Justice Kennedy, dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
White and Blackmun, found that circumscription is "as unworkable as it is il-
logical." [d. at 833-34 (Rehnquist, CJ., & White, Blackmun, Kennedy, lJ., dis-
senting); see also Ellison v. Sachs, 769 F.2d 955, 959 (4th Cir. 1985) (differenti-
ating carefully between the victim's uncorroborated out-of-court statements of 
identification, which "contained no sufficient assurance of accuracy," and her 
out-of-court statement, corroborated by physical evidence, that she was sexu-
ally assaulted); Serrato, supra note 47, at 162 (citing to studies and cases indi-
cating that only a small percentage of abuse victims fabricate their allega-
tions); cf Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 604-{)5 (1994) (evaluating 
a statement offered under the hearsay exception for declarations against pe-
nal interest, under all the relevant circumstances, to determine whether each 
part of it was sufficiently deserving to be reliable). 
145. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 808. 
146. See id. at 809. 
147. See id. 
148. [d. 
149. See id. at 809-11. 
150. See id. at 812. 
151. See id. at 813. 
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was unavailable to testify at the trial. 152 It then "reject[ed] [the 
mother's] contention that the younger daughter's out-of-court state-
ments in this case [were] per se unreliable, or at least presumptively 
unreliable, on the ground that the trial court found the younger 
daughter incompetent to testify at trial."153 Rather than equating in-
competency with unreliability, the Court held that a case-by-case in-
quiry as to the reliability of the out-of-court statement is required: 
[T] he Confrontation Clause does not erect a per se rule 
barring the admission of prior statements of a declarant 
who is unable to communicate to the jury at the time of 
trial. Although such inability might be relevant to whether 
the earlier hearsay statement possessed particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness, a per se rule of exclusion would 
not only frustrate the truth-seeking purpose of the Confron-
tation Clause, but would also hinder States in their own 
"enlightened development in the law of evidence."154 
In its discussion, the Wright Court approved the state courts' 
use of factors, such as those set forth in Article 27, Section 775 (d) 
of the Annotated Code of Maryland,155 in determining "whether the 
child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when 
the [out-of-court] statement was made."156 It also rejected the impo-
sition of a constitutional requirement that the out-of-court state-
ments be videotaped. For the majority, Justice O'Connor wrote: 
"The state and federal courts have identified a number of factors 
152. See id. at 815-16. 
153. [d. at 824. The Court continued: 
First, respondent's contention rests upon a questionable reading 
of the record in this case. The trial court found only that the 
younger daughter was "not capable of communicating to the jury." 
App. 39. Although Idaho law provides that a child witness may not 
testify if he "appear[s] incapable of receiving just impressions of the 
facts respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly," 
Idaho Code § 9-202 (Supp. 1989); Idaho Rule Evid. 601(a), the trial 
court in this case made no such findings. Indeed, the more reasona-
ble inference is that, by ruling that the statements were admissible 
under Idaho's residual hearsay exception, the trial court implicitly 
found that the younger daughter, at the time she made the state-
ments, was capable of receiving just impressions of the facts and of 
relating them truly. See App. 115. 
Wright, 497 U.S. at 824-25 (alteration in original). 
154. Wright, 497 U.S. at 825 (citations omitted). 
155. For the full text of § 775, with amendments, see the Appendix to this Article. 
156. Wright, 497 U.S. at 822. 
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that we think properly relate to whether hearsay statements made 
by a child witness in child sexual abuse cases are reliable." 157 In de-
veloping a test for Confrontation Clause challenges, Justice 
O'Conner stated: 
Although the procedural guidelines propounded by the 
court below may well enhance the reliability of out-of-court 
statements of children regarding sexual abuse, we decline 
to read into the Confrontation Clause a preconceived and 
artificial litmus test for the procedural propriety of profes-
sional interviews in which children make hearsay statements 
against a defendant."158 
Nonetheless, the majority found the particular statement at is-
sue in Wright to be insufficiently reliable under the totality of the 
circumstances, thus failing to satisfy the requirements of the Con-
frontation Clause.159 The child had not volunteered the information 
when asked general questions, and she gave pertinent responses 
only when asked detailed leading questions. 160 Therefore, the admis-
sion of the doctor's testimony as to the child's statements was re-
versible error in light of the record as a whole. 161 
An example of the application of Wright's test for evaluating the 
reliability of children's out-of-court statements admitted under a 
non-firmly rooted hearsay exception is found in Doe v. United 
States. 162 In Doe, the statements were made by a three-year-old girl 
and a three-year-old boy, who were from two different families, to 
their respective parents. 163 The detail, language, and other factors of 
the statements were held to provide sufficient indicia of reliability, 
and their admission at trial was upheld on appeal. l64 
C. Maryland Case Law on the Constitutionality of the Tender Years 
Statute 
Maryland's high court follows the Supreme Court case law on 
the confrontation right, because it construes the Maryland and fed-
157. [d. at 821. 
158. [d. at 819. 
159. See id. at 818-21. 
160. See id. at 810-11. 
161. See id. at 827. 
162. 976 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1992). 
163. See id. at 1073-74. 
164. See id. at 1077-79 (detailing the statements); see also id. at 1079-82 (analyzing 
the reliability of the statements). 
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eral clauses in pari materia. 165 Maryland's tender years statute, as ini-
tially adopted in 1988, was upheld as facially constitutional by the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in an unreported opinion. l66 
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TENDER YEARS STATUTE: 
CHRONICLING THE "TENDER YEARS" WAR 
A. The 1988 Statute 
The tender years statute is a perennial issue before the Mary-
land General Assembly. Since 1988, when the Maryland General As-
sembly first enacted Section 9-103.1 of the Courts and Judicial Pro-
ceedings Article of the Maryland Annotated Codel67 (1988 Statute), 
bills proposing changes to the statute have been introduced every 
year. Some liberalization has been accomplished; however, attempts 
to both extend the statute and to retrench it failed in the 1997 leg-
islative sessions. Most recently, the statute was mildly extended in 
the 1998 session}68 
1. Types of Proceedings in Which the Hearsay Exception Was 
Available 
The 1988 Statute applied only to the possible admissibility of 
statements of child-victims under the age of twelve in criminal pro-
ceedings "concerning an alleged offense against the child [who 
made the statement] of ... [c]hild abuse, as defined under Article 
27, § 35A of the Code."169 Thus, the 1988 Statute did not apply in 
non-criminal proceedings, such as suits involving child custody, visi-
tation, and protective orders; suits for damages resulting from child 
abuse; and juvenile proceedings, whether delinquency or Child in 
165. See 6 MCLAIN, supra note 70, § 80Ll n.4. 
166. See Bethea v. State, Nos. 1546 & 1550 (Md. App. June 19, 1990) (per curiam). 
167. See S. 66, 1988 Md. Laws ch. 548 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§ 9-103.1 (Supp. 1988) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (1997) 
(amended 1998»). Because citation to superseded versions of the tender years 
statute, codified in § 9-103.1, would not provide the easiest means to locate 
this source, citations are made to the enacted bills found in the volumes of 
Laws of the State of Maryland. Likewise, citations are made to either the Senate 
or House bill, which both contain the enacted version (with deletions and ad-
ditions reflecting amendments), when no comparison is necessary. 
168. See H.D. 590 (Md. 1988) (effective October 1, 1998), available in <http:// 
mlis.state.md.us/1998rs/billfile/HB0590.htm> (visited April 20, 1998); see also 
supra note 11, 246 and accompanying text (detailing 1998 amendments). Sec-
tion 777, with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix to this Article. 
169. S. 66, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (b) (1). 
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Need of Assistance (CINA) proceedings. 17o 
The 1988 Statute was also inapplicable in criminal proceedings 
with regard to any other charged crime, such as a sexual offense 
under Article 27, Sectio'ns 464B and 464C of the Maryland Anno-
tated Code, and a crime of violence under Article 27, Section 643B 
of the Maryland Annotated Code.171 Senate Bill 66, in the form in 
which it first passed the Maryland Senate, would have extended the 
1988 Statute to Sections 35A and 643B crimes; however, in confer-
ence, the Senate acceded to the Maryland House of Delegates' ver-
sion, which had no such extension. 172 
2. The Introduction of the Restrictive "Categories" of Possible 
Witnesses 
Senate Bill 66 would have given the prosecution the opportu-
nity to demonstrate that a particular statement was reliable without 
restrictions regarding to whom the statement was made. 173 However, 
the House Judiciary Committee severely limited the statute to apply 
only to statements made and testified to by a licensed physician, li-
censed psychologist, or licensed social worker who was acting in the 
course of his profession when the child made the statement.174 In 
conference, the Senate added "a teacher" to the list of potential 
fact witnesses to the child's statement. 175 
Under the 1988 Statute and its current version, if the child's 
first report of the alleged abuse was to someone other than a per-
son in one of the listed professions, then in order for the prosecu-
tion to invoke the hearsay exception, the child must be taken to see 
a teacher, physician, psychologist, social worker, etc. If the child 
again complains of abuse in the presence of one of these persons, 
170. See id. 
171. See id. 
172. See id. (striking provisions which would have extended the 1988 Statute); H.D. 
1018, 1988 Md. Laws ch. 549 (omitting provisions). 
173. See S. 66. See generally Hamish v. State, 9 Md. App. 546, 549-51, 266 A.2d 364, 
365-66 (1970) (focusing on the reliability of the statement itself and not em-
phasizing to whom it was made). 
174. See HD. 1018, sec.1, § 9-103.1(b)(2). 
175. See S. 66, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (b)(2) (i)(4). The 1988 Statute incorporated specific 
definitions of the terms "licensed physician," "licensed psychologist," and "li-
censed social worker." See id. § 9-103.1 (b) (2) (i)(1)-(3). However, the 1988 Stat-
ute provided no definition of the term "teacher." See id. § 9-103.1 (b) (2) (1) (4). 
The current version also does not define "teacher." See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 
§ 775 (b) (2) (i) (4) (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). 
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the prosecution could offer that person as a witness for the purpose 
of testifying to the child's statement made to them. 
3. Pre-trial Notice and Judicial Determination as to Reliability 
The 1988 Statute required the State to provide pre-trial notice 
of its intention to offer testimony under the tender years exception 
and of the contents of the statement. 176 After pre-trial notice, the 
trial court must conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury 
to "make a finding on the record as to the specific guarantees of 
trustworthiness that are present in the statement,"177 and the court 
must thereafter rule on the statement's admissibility.178 The twelve 
specific guarantees and considerations listed in the 1988 Statute 
were those generally found in pre-existing models and other states' 
statutes. 179 The conference committee deleted from the list a factor 
included in Senate Bill 66--"whether the statement was audiotaped 
or videotaped, if taping would have been reasonably feasible. "180 
4. Corroboration Requirement 
When the child-victim was unavailable to testify, the 1988 Stat-
ute further conditioned admissibility of an out-of-court statement 
that was otherwise qualified on the existence of corroborative evi-
dence. 181 The statute left that phrase undefined. 182 The Senate bill 
had required "corroborative evidence of the alleged offense. "183 The 
House bill did not employ the prepositional phrase "of the alleged 
offense." 184 In conference, the Senate acceded to the House 
version. 185 
176. See S. 66, sec. 1, § 9-103.1(c)(3); see also § 775(c) (3); Bruce v. State, 96 Md. 
App. 510, 524-25, 625 A.2d 416, 423 (1993). 
177. S. 66, sec. 1, § 9-103.1(e)(I); accord § 775(e)(I). 
178. See S. 66, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (e) (2); see also § 775(e) (2). 
179. Compare Lynn McLain, Maryland's Statutory Hearsay Exception for Reliable State-
ments I7y Alleged Child Abuse Victims: A Hesitant Step Forward, 17 U. BALT. L. REv. 
1, 19 n.74 (1987) (compiling 18 considerations suggested or adopted by 
courts, commentators, legislatures, and organizations), with S. 66, sec. 1, § 9-
103.1 (d) (1 )-( 12) (codifYing 12 of the 18 considerations). 
180. S. 66. This deletion warrants the inference that the absence of taping should 
not be considered a negative factor. 
181. See id. § 9-103.1 (c) (2) (iii). 
182. See id. 
183. [d. 
184. See H.D. 1018, 1988 Md. Laws ch. 549. 
185. See S. 66. 
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5. Restrictions as to Child's Testifying or Being Unavailable to 
Testify 
Under the 1988 Statute, an out-of-court statement that the trial 
judge found reliable was admissible if the child either testified at 
trial or if the child was unavailable to testify for certain reasons. 186 
First, the statement was admissible "if the child is subject to cross-
examination about the out of court statement and testifies: (i) at 
the criminal proceeding; or (ii) by c1osed-circuit television."187 
Second, the statement was admissible if the child was unavaila-
ble to testify due to one of four following reasons: 
1. Death; 
2. Absence from the jurisdiction, for good cause shown, 
and the state has been unable to procure the child's 
presence by subpoena or other reasonable means; 
3. Serious physical disability; or 
4. Inability to communicate about the alleged offense due 
to serious emotional distress. 188 
The first three grounds for establishing unavailability were well 
established.189 The fourth ground was similar to Maryland's statutory 
prerequisite for allowing a child to testify over closed-circuit televi-
sion,190 but for purposes of the 1988 Act, the child's inability to 
communicate would have to have been so extreme as to preclude 
even televised testimony. 
Without explanation, the 1988 Statute omitted other recog-
nized bas~s for unavailability, including the child's complete failure 
of memory; persistent refusal to testify, despite judicial requests; 
mental disability; privilege; and incompetency at the time of trial. 191 
In particular, the exclusion of incompetency as a basis for unavaila-
bility has severely undercut the usefulness of the tender years hear-
say exception, because a court's ruling that a young child is incom-
186. See id. sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (c)(I)-(2). 
187. Id. § 9-103.1(c)(I). 
188. Id. § 9-103.1(c)(I)(i). 
189. See McLain, supra note 179, at 35 & n.142 (noting these three grounds were 
taken from the rules governing use of depositions at trial, and citing MD. RULE 
2-419(a)(3),4-261(h)(I». 
190. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102 (Supp. 1987) (permitting closed-
circuit testimony if "[t]he judge determines that testimony by the child victim 
in the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress 
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate") (current version at MD. 
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 774(2) (Supp. 1997». 
191. Compare FED. R EVID. 804(a) (1)-(4), with S. 66. 
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petent to testify frequently results in the State dropping its 
charges. 192 
In 1988, although the Maryland General Assembly had before it 
several bills that would have provided that all children who were vic-
tims of child abuse or of particular sexual offenses were competent 
to testify, those bills were defeated in the House Judiciary Commit-
tee. 193 If any of those bills had passed, excluding incompetency as a 
factor in determining unavailability would have been understanda-
ble. In the long run, however, such a law would not have been ad-
visable because a conclusive (rather than a rebuttable) presumption 
of competency194 would likely violate due process. 195 
6. Accused's Right to Take Deposition 
A novel and unique provision in the 1988 Statute gave the 
defendant the right to depose the witness offered by the State to 
192. See generally Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 943 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Often, the 
child is the only witness. Yet age may make the child incompetent to testify in 
court . . . . • [[W]] hen the choice is between evidence which is less than best 
and no evidence at all, only clear folly would dictate an across-the-board pol-
icy of doing without.''' (quoting FED. R EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's 
note» . 
193. See S. 280, MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL 331-32 (1988) (full text of bill on file 
with author); H.D. 378, MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 379-80 (1988) (full text of 
bill on file with author). 
194. See S. 280. Senate Bill 280 passed the Maryland Senate by a 45-to-l vote, see 
MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL 1417 (1988), but received an unfavorable report in 
the House Judiciary Committee, see generally MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 199 
(1988) (index) (containing only one reference to H.D. 378, which referred 
the bill to the House Judiciary Committee). It would have repealed MD. CODE 
ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 9-103 (Supp. 1987) ("In a criminal trial, the age of a 
child may not be the reason for precluding a child from testifYing."), and 
amended id. § 9-101, adding the following provision: 
(B)(I)Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of evi-
dence, a child victim under the age of 12 is a competent witness and 
shall be allowed to testify without prior qualification in the following 
cases: 
S.280. 
(i) Child abuse, as defined in § 5-701 of the family law article or 
article 27, § 35A of the Code; 
(ii) A sexual offense, as defined in article 27, § 464, § 464A, 
§ 464B, or 464C of the Code; or 
(iii) Rape, as defined in article 27, § 462 or § 463 of the Code, 
(2) The trier of fact shall determine the weight and credibility to 
be given to the child victim's testimony." 
195. See 5 MCLAIN, supra note 70, § 301.5. 
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testify as to the child's statement. 196 In other criminal cases, there is 
no such right. 
B. Subsequent Amendments 
Numerous amendments have been made to Section 9-103.1 
since its enactment in 1988. 
1. Types of Proceedings in which the Tender Years Exception IS 
Applicable 
A 1991 amendment extended Section 9-103.1 to apply in CINA 
proceedings concerning an alleged offense against the child of 
abuse or neglect. 197 Effective October 1, 1992, Section 9-103.1 was 
made applicable to alleged offenses of rape or sexual offense198 and 
assault with intent to commit rape or sexual offense. 199 Effective Oc-
tober 1, 1994, the Section 9-103.1 hearsay exception was extended to 
apply in juvenile court proceedings.2°O Finally, a 1996 Act inexplica-
bly transferred the tender years statute to Section 775 of Article 27, 
despite the fact that it applies in CINA and juvenile delinquency 
proceedings.201 
2. What Constituted Unavailability to Testify 
There are difficulties in finding satisfactory language to extend 
the definition of unavailability to include a young child who is de-
clared incompetent to testify at trial. Therefore, Section 9-103.1 was 
ultimately changed in 1994 to make the tender years exception 
available regardless whether the child testifies or is available to tes-
tify.202 Thus, a child's out-of-court statement that otherwise qualifies 
may be reviewed for reliability, whether the court finds that child 
unavailable or not. 
196. See S. 66, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (c) (4) (i). 
197. See H.D. 765, sec. 1, § 9-103.1(b)(1), 1991 Md. Laws ch. 399. 
198. See S. 429, sec. 1, § 9-103:l(b)(1) (ii), 1992 Md. Laws ch. 253. 
199. See id. § 9-103.1 (b) (1) (iii). 
200. See S. 340, sec. 1, § 9-103.1(b)(l) (iv) , 1994 Md. Laws ch. 169. 
201. See 1996 Md. Laws ch. 585, § 5. The provision regarding closed-circuit testi-
mony was likewise transferred to Section 774, but, unlike Section 775, it ap-
plies only in criminal cases. See id. Further, in 1996, the reference to Article 
27, Section 35(a) was changed to Section 35(c). See 1996 Md. Laws ch. 10. 
This effected no substantive change. 
202. SeeS. 340, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (c)(ii). 
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a. Bills Regarding Young Children Who Are Incompetent to Testify at Trial 
For several years, the Maryland General Assembly considered 
bills that attempted to redress the 1988 Statute's per se inapplicabil-
ity, because of its sui generis definition of unavailability, when a 
young child was found incompetent to testify at trial. 
1. Language of the Bills 
Senate Bill 498, proposed in the 1993 session, would have ad-
ded, as a ground for unavailability, a child victim's "inability to tes-
tify due to ... incompetence.''203 This would have directly addressed 
the problem.204 Several other states explicitly permit the potential 
admission of out-of-court statements by children found "incompe-
tent" or "disqualified" to testify.205 Senate Bill 498 was amended, 
however, to refer more narrowly to a child's "incompetency to tes-
tify due to age."206 A serious problem arose, because in 1985 the 
General Assembly had passed Section 9-103 of the Courts and Judi-
cial Proceedings Article,207 which provides that, "[i]n a criminal 
trial, the age of a child may not be the reason for precluding a 
child from testifying. "208 Thus, Senate Bill 498 referred to a null 
class: no child could legally be found incompetent due to age. 
In order to circumvent the uselessness of Senate Bill 498, Sen-
ate Bill 340 was proposed in the 1994 legislative session.209 It pro-
posed to amend Section 9-103.1 to provide: 
(c)(2)(i) The child is unavailable to testify at the criminal pro-
ceeding or CINA proceeding due to the child's: 
203. S. 498, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (c)(2) (i)(5), MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL 430 (1993) (full 
text of bill on file with author). 
204. See generally supra notes 191-192 and accompanying text. 
205. See AlA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513(a) (1995); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 60460(dd) (Supp. 1997); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 81(b) 
(West 1997); OR. R EVID. 803(18a)(b); R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-69 (1995); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (West Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:2 
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997). 
206. S. 498, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (c) (2) (i) (5). 
207. See 1985 Md. Laws ch. 498 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & 
JUD. PROC. § 9-103 (1995». 
208. § 9-103. Section 9-103 merely codified the common-law rule that extreme 
youth is not a per se bar to a child's testimony; rather, the trial judge must in-
dividually examine children as to their ability to give competent testimony. See 
MuRPHY, supra note 64, § 602(A) ("[A]ge alone ha[s] never been the test for 
incompetency [in Maryland]."). 
209. See S. 340, 1994 Md. Laws ch. 169 (containing bill as enacted and deleted pro-
visions). 
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5. Level of cognitive development, including ability to under-
stand abstract concepts, capacity for long-term memory, and 
ability to articulate upon demand.210 
This proposed provision ("incompetency exception") was explained 
in a fact sheet submitted by Ellen Mugmon, a member of the Gov"-
ernor's Council on Child Abuse and Neglect: 
The reasons for this provision include: (1) [children's] in-
ability to understand the abstract concept of an oath; (2) 
fading of their memories during the delay between the 
crime and the court appearance; and (3) their inability to 
articulate upon demand because of anxiety and fear of the 
proceedings, or because they are too young to come up 
with a command performance at a specific time.211 
The incompetency exception avoided conflict with Section 9-103 be-
cause these factors, although related to age, do not refer to chrono-
logical age. 
Explaining the whys and wherefores of this language to the legis-
lators proved problematic. First, legislators had difficulty under-
standing how a child who could be physically present at trial could 
be considered "unavailable to testify." Second, they struggled with 
the counter-intuitive concept that a child might be incompetent to 
testify, but still could have made a reliable out-of-court statement 
before trial. 
ii. How Can a Physically Available Child Be Unavailable as a 
Witness? 
Some opponents of the incompetency exception have argued 
that it is nonsensical to say that a child who is physically available to 
be brought into the courtroom at trial is nonetheless unavailable. 
The answer to this is that "unavailable to testify" simply means that 
the witness is unable to be cross-examined at the trial or proceed-
ing. Physical inability to come to court or the parties' inability to 
serve a person with process are only two examples of 
unavailability.212 
210. Id. sec. 1, § 9-103.1(c)(2)(i) (deleted from enacted bill). 
211. Memorandum from Ellen Mugmon, Member, Governor's Council on Child 
Abuse and Neglect, to the Maryland House of Delegates Judiciary Committee 
(April 3, 1994) (on file with author). See generally 1 MYERS, supra note 29, 
§§ 3.1 to -.24. 
212. See MD. RULE 5-804. 
1997] "Tender Years" War 53 
Unavailable witnesses also include those who can be present or 
are present in the courtroom, but who refuse to testifY despite the 
court's order to do so.213 In addition, unavailability encompasses wit-
nesses whom the court rules protect by a privilege against testify-
ing,214 or because of their mental incapacity.215 The defense cannot 
cross-examine a child whom the court has declared unable to testifY. 
Therefore, when the court determines that a child is incompetent 
to testifY, while that child may be physically able to testifY, he is un-
available to testifY under Maryland law. 
lll. How Can a Child Who is Found Incompetent to TestifY at Trial 
Have Possibly Made a Reliable Out-of-Court Statement? 
In the past, opponents of the incompetency exception have 
questioned how a witness who is unqualified to testifY at trial could 
possibly have made a reliable out-of-court statement. First, it is im-
portant to stress the word "possibly," within the context of Mary-
land's tender years statute. The incompetency exception only opens 
the door to consideration by the court as to whether a particular 
statement is reliable. It in no way directs that all statements will 
have sufficient indicia of reliability; it simply provides that some 
statements might, and statements should be looked at on a case-by-
case basis. The incompetency exception dismantles the per se ban 
against admissibility. This type of reasoning is in accord with the ju-
risprudence of other states216 and the Supreme Court.217 
213. See id. 5-804 (a) (2). 
214. See id. 5-804(a) (1). 
215. See id. 5-804(a)(4); see also id. 2418(a)(3)(C), 4-261 (h) (I)(B); Brown v. State, 
317 Md. 417, 420-21, 564 A.2d 772, 774 (1989); People v. District Court of El 
Paso County, 776 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Colo. 1989) ("In Colorado, a child who is 
not competent to testify is unavailable within the meaning of section 13-25-
129(1) (b)(II). This rule reflects a common-sense understanding that when a 
party is prohibited by a court from testifying, neither the prosecution nor de-
fense is able to call the party to testify." (citations omitted». 
216. See El Paso County, 776 P.2d at 1087 ("[W]e promote the rule that a child's 
out-of-court declaration is not automatically rendered inadmissible merely be-
cause the child was found to be not competent at the competency hearing 
.... A child's reliable out-of-court statement that accurately relates an inci-
dent of abuse will not be barred .... "); Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206, 211 
(Fla. 1989) ("The fact that a child is incompetent to testify at trial ... does 
not necessarily mean that the child is unable to state the truth. The require-
ment that the trial court find that the time, content, and circumstances of the 
statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability furnishes a sufficient guar-
antee of trustworthiness of the hearsay statement, obviating the necessity that 
the child understand the duty of a witness to tell the truth."); People v. 
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Secondly, it is well established under Maryland law that one 
need not qualify as a competent witness at trial in order to have the 
ability to have made out-of-court statements that qualify as admissi-
ble hearsay.218 
Maryland courts have admitted out-of-court statements of adult 
witnesses that qualify under exceptions to the hearsay rule without 
considering whether the out-of-court declarants would have been 
competent to testify at trial.219 Additionally, Maryland courts have 
admitted hearsay when the out-of-court declarant was capable of 
making cogent, reliable statements in the past, but was not capable 
of doing so at trial.220 
Rocha, 547 N.E.2d 1335, 1341 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that incompetency 
to testify due to either an inability to communicate or tender years does not 
necessarily render the out-<>f-court statement unreliable); State v. Gribble, 804 
P.2d 634,639 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) ("[A] finding of reliability through use of 
[particularized] factors is a sufficient assurance of trustworthiness to make un-
necessary an inquiry into testimonial competence at the time the hearsay 
statements are made."); 1 MYERS, supra note 28, § 1.38; see also Miller v. State, 
517 N.E.2d 64, 72 n.7 (Ind. 1987) (upholding the constitutionality of a state 
statute that required a child victim to be incompetent before her videotaped 
testimony could be admitted). 
217. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992) (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 
1012, 1020 (1988) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987»); see 
also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 825 (1990) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause 
does not erect a per se rule barring the admission of prior statements of a de-
clarant who is unable to communicate to the jury at the time of trial. Al-
though such inability might be relevant to whether the earlier hearsay state-
ment possessed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, a per se rule of 
exclusion would not only frustrate the truth-seeking purpose of the Confronta-
tion Clause, but would also hinder States in their own 'enlightened develop-
ment in the law of evidence.' " (citations omitted»; see supra note 137 and ac-
companying text. 
218. See, e.g., Embrey v. Holly, 48 Md. App. 571, 597-601, 429 A.2d 251, 268-69 
(1981) (holding that the identity of anonymous phone callers, which would be 
necessary to determine their competency, was not necessary to admit their 
out-<>f-court statements under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule; 
the only requirement was that the statement was made with apparent sincer-
ity), aff'd in part and reu'd in part on other grounds, 293 Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966 
(1982). 
219. See id. 
220. See, e.g., Contee v. State, 229 Md. 486, 490-92, 184 A.2d 823, 825-26 (1962) 
(finding that prior testimony was admissible upon the testimony of the direc-
tor of a mental hospital that the declarant had been declared insane, perma-
nently committed subsequent to her original testimony, and incapable of testi-
fying at the time of trial); Johnson v. State, 63 Md. App. 485, 490-94, 494 A.2d 
1343, 1347-48 (1985) (holding admissible an excited utterance of a victim who 
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In this respect, the courts have treated children's statements 
the same way as they have treated adults. Maryland cases have held 
admissible out-of-court statements of children, qualifying under es-
tablished exceptions to the hearsay rule, even though the children 
were too young to testify at trial.22 I Maryland case law is in accord 
with that of the federal courts222 and other jurisdictions on this 
point.223 
was incompetent at trial, but who had been "apparently capable of maintain-
ing herself in her own apartment" at the time of the statement). Notably, 
these cases do not distinguish between incompetency due to youth and incom-
petency due to mental illness or insanity; Senate Bill 340 would have included 
the former but not the latter in the definition of "unavailable." See S. 340, sec. 
1, § 9-103.1 (c) (2) (i) (5), 1994 Md. Laws ch. 169 (deleted from enacted bill). 
221. See Jackson v. State, 31 Md. App. 332, 336, 343, 356 A.2d 299, 301, 304 (1976); 
Moore v. State, 26 Md. App. 556, 561, 338 A.2d 344, 34647 (1975) (holding 
that the out-of-court statements made by a three-and-one-half-year-old victim 
of physical abuse to a physician in the emergency room were properly admit-
ted; relying on Dean Wigmore and McCormick, the Court stated that the is-
sue of testimonial competence of the child was "irrelevant since the testimo-
• nial qualifications do not apply to spontaneous declarations."); Smith v. State, 
6 Md. App. 581, 587, 252 A.2d 277, 281 (1969) (finding that an excited utter-
ance of child who was incompetent to testify at trial was properly admitted). 
222. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
223. See, e.g., Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 n.2 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that 
although the child interviewed on videotape by a doctor was not competent to 
testify, others could have testified to provide the proper foundation for admit-
ting the child's out-of-court statements under FED. R EVID. 803(4), and that 
the treating doctor's role was explained to the child and that she understood 
it); Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d 1071, 1082 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding no abuse 
of discretion in admitting children's hearsay statements under the catch-all 
hearsay exception, even though the district court conducted no. inquiry to de-
termine the competency of the three-year-old declarants); Myatt v. Hannigan, 
910 F.2d 680, 682, 685 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that Kansas's child hearsay 
statute did not violate the Confrontation Clause, nor did the admission of an 
"unqualified" child's reliable out-of-court statements to a social worker and a 
police officer); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 94647 & n.9, 949-50 (4th Cir. 
1988) (finding it reversible error to exclude a young child's spontaneous dec-
larations made from the time she was two-and-one-half until she was three-
and-one-half, that were excited utterances to her mother and statements made 
to a child psychologist for purposes of medical treatment, even if declarant 
was incompetent to testify at trial); United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 
144244 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that when a five-year-old girl testified at trial, 
but "because of her age and obvious fright," she did not testify meaningfully, 
her reliable out-of-court statement to her emergency foster mother, made dur-
ing the third interview on the subject, was properly admitted under FED. R 
EVID.803(24». 
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iv. Ultimate Resolution by Finessing the Issue: In Camera Examina-
tion and Corroboration Requirements 
Difficulty in coming up with a saleable and pragmatic defini-
tion of "incompetency to testify" led to a jettisoning of the attempt 
to do so. Instead, Senate Bill 340 was amended in 1994 so that the 
tender years exception is potentially applicable "regardless of 
whether the child testifies. "224 Thus, the statement of a child who is 
incompetent to testify can be evaluated for reliability by the court 
because an incompetent child may be either available or unavailable 
to testify. 
(a) In Camera Examination of Child 
In determining the admissibility of a child's statement, Mary-
land's tender years statute requires an in camera examination, except 
"where the child (i) [h]as died, or (ii) [i]s absent from the jurisdic-
tion for good cause shown, or the State has been unable to procure 
the child's presence by subpoena or other reasonable means."225 
The court must conduct such examination of a child in the pres-
ence of the defense attorney and the prosecutor, but "may not per-
mit" the presence of the defendant.226 • 
(b) Corroboration Requirement 
Furthermore, under the 1994 amendment: 
[i]f the child does not testify, the child's out of court state-
ment will be admissible only if there is corroborative evi-
dence that: (i) [t]he defendant in a criminal proceeding 
had the opportunity to commit the alleged offense; or (ii) 
the alleged offender in a juvenile court proceeding had the 
opportunity to commit the alleged abuse or neglect. 227 
In Idaho v. Wright,228 the United States Supreme Court decided 
that corroborative evidence cannot be used to support a finding of 
sufficient reliability of an out-of-court statement.229 However, this de-
cision does not preclude a state from adding a corroboration re-
224. S. 340, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (c)(1) (ii); accord MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775(c)(1)(ii) 
(Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). 
225. See § 775 (f) (1). Section 775, with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix 
to this Article. 
226. [d. § 775 (f) (2) (ii) (2). 
227. [d. § 775 (c) (2). 
228. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
229. See id. at 823. 
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quirement as a second hurdle to admissibility. The 1994 Maryland 
amendment adds this requirement when the child does not testify 
at trial. 230 
h. MSTA's Proposed Amendments 
In 1997, the Maryland State Teachers' Association (MSTA) lob-
bied strenuously against any extension of the tender years excep-
tion. MSTA also submitted several retrenching amendments, includ-
ing one that would return Maryland to pre-1994 law as to children 
who are incompetent to testify at trial "because of age."231 Under 
this proposed amendment, a judge could not consider admitting 
these children's statements because they would neither testify nor 
be unavailable. A fundamental purpose of the statute in the first 
place-admitting reliable evidence when the child is too young to 
testify232-would be frustrated by this proposed amendment. 
The MSTA's amendment would require that: 
the child testifies at the trial; or is found by the court to be un-
available as a witness for one (1) of the following reasons: 
1. From the testimony of a psychiatrist, physician, or psycholo-
gist, and other evidence, if any, the court finds that the child's 
testifying in the physical presence of the defendant will cause 
the child to suffer serious emotional distress such that the child 
cannot reasonably communicate; or 
2. is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because 
of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; 
or 
3. is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court.233 
Subsection 1 of MSTA's amendment would add a requirement 
of expert testimony-and hence cost-that does not exist in the 
current statute. Additionally, subsection 3 is arguably unconstitu-
tional as applied in criminal cases. The Constitution requires that 
the State make reasonable efforts to obtain the attendance or testi-
mony of a witness, even one who is beyond the court's 
jurisdiction.234 
230. See § 775 (c) (2). 
231. See MSTA, House BiU 98 - List of MSTA Proposed Amendments 'I 4 Gan. 8, 1997) 
(on file with author). See generally H.D. 98, MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 77 
(1997) (full text of bill on file with author); supra Part IV.B.2.a.i. 
232. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
233. MSTA, supra note 231, 'II 4. 
234. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 721 (1968) (stating that merely being out of 
the jurisdiction is insufficient-the State must make a good faith attempt at 
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3. The Deposition Provision 
Several bills, including Senate Bill 658235 in the 1997 session, 
have proposed the elimination of the deposition provision. Two 
sound rationales support this change: (1) because no justification 
has been made to single out this kind of hearsay witness from any 
other, and (2) because of the deterrent cost the provision imposes 
on the State. To date, no amendments effecting this change have 
been adopted. 
4. "Categories" of Walks of Life of Witnesses who Heard Child's 
Statement 
Probably the most illogical provision of Maryland's tender years 
statute is its restrictive list as to the professions that a witness, who 
has heard a child's out-of-court statement, must hold, in order for a 
court to look at the child's statement and screen it for reliability. 
Repeated sessions have seen bills that would have amended this pro-
vision, either by modestly expanding the list of professions, or by 
simply doing away with the list altogether. In 1998, the Maryland 
General Assembly passed an amendment that modestly expanded 
and liberalized this provision.236 
a. Modest Proposals 
Numerous proponents have pointed out the illogic of restrict-
ing physicians, psychologists, and social workers to such "licensed" 
professionals, when, for example, interns practicing in Maryland 
and staffing the emergency rooms are often not licensed in Mary-
land, and jurisdictions such as Baltimore City do not have "li-
censed" social workers. These limitations frustrate the state's inter-
est in protecting children.237 
For example, Delegate Ulysses Currie from Prince George's 
County, wrote in a letter to the editor in 1993: 
obtaining, through all reasonable means, the presence of a witness who is 
outside of the jurisdiction); State v. Breeden, 333 Md. 212, 227 n.5, 634 A.2d 
464, 471 n.5 (1993); Cordovi v. State, 63 Md. App. 455, 462-63, 492 A.2d 1328, 
1331-32 (1985). 
235. S. 658, MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 173940 (1997) (full text of bill on file with 
author). 
236. See infra note 246 and accompanying text; supra note 11 and accompanying 
text. Section 775, with amendments, is contained in the Appendix to this Arti-
cle. 
237. See, e.g., Jessica Collins, Statement to the Maryland House of Delegates, Judici-
ary Committee (1993) (on file with author). 
1997] "Tender Years" War 
During the 1992 session of the General Assembly, the 
state Department of Human Resources pushed for passage 
of legislation to allow unlicensed social workers to present 
such testimony. Unlicensed social workers make up almost 
one-third of the state's child protective services staff.-170 
out of 550 workers- because the agency cannot afford a 
100 percent licensed staff. The legislation was killed. 
In the 1993 legislative session, the department again 
pushed for legislation to expand the list of professionals 
who can give child-abuse hearsay testimony to include any 
professional employee of any correctional, educational, 
health, juvenile services or social services agency, institution 
or licensed facility. This would add to the list counselors, 
unlicensed social workers, case workers, probation and pa-
role and police officers, etc. The bill won Senate approval 
but failed by one vote in the House Judiciary Committee. 
I find it impossible to understand why such a law does 
not have unanimous support. Charles A. Chiapparelli, chief 
of the Child Abuse Division of Baltimore's State's Attorney's 
Office, says he has seen case after case in which accused 
child abusers go free because statements from unlicensed 
social workers could not be used. 
The law now stacks the odds against the child victim. If 
a child discloses an incident of abuse to a policeman, emer-
gency room nurse or any other of the many professionals 
legally prohibited from presenting hearsay testimony, the 
case folds, and the abuser goes free. 
It also should be noted that the current law defies 
logic. On one hand, it requires all "health practitioners" to 
report suspected child abuse; on the other hand, it allows 
only licensed physicians and psychologists to testify. 238 
59 
In 1993, Senate Bill 498,239 and again in 1994, Senate Bill 34()240 
proposed to add the following "categories" of potential witnesses: 
238. Ulysses Currie, Stacking the Odds Against Abused Children, THE WASH. POST, June 
6, 1993, at 8. See generally MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-704 (Supp. 1997) (re-
quiring "each health practitioner, police officer, or educator or human service 
worker" to report suspected child abuse). 
239. S. 498, MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL 430 (1993). 
240. S. 340, 1994 Md. Laws ch. 169 (containing bill as enacted and deleted provi-
sions). 
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5. An intern or resident acting under the supervIsion of a 
licensed physician or working in an accredited hospital; 6. A 
registered nurse, as defined under § 8-101 of the health oc-
cupations article; 
7. A physician assistant, as defined under § 15-101 of the 
health occupations article; 
8. A school psychologist certified by the state department of 
education; or 
9. A certified professional counselor, as defined under § 17-
101 of the health occupations article .... 241 
These proposals died in the House Judiciary Committee.242 
In 1996, Carolyn H. Lingeman, M.D. explained the practicality 
of expanding the list through written testimony to the House Judici-
ary Committee: 
I believe that admissible testimony regarding out of 
court statements in child abuse cases should not be limited 
to the four categories of licensed professionals specified in 
the current law. Among those whose testimony should also 
be accepted are nurses, police detectives, members of the 
clergy, and other trusted individuals to whom a child may 
confide the details of abuse. Decisions about the credibility 
of the witnesses should be the responsibility of the 
Court. . . . Sometimes it is a police detective who is investi-
gating after the mandatory reporting of suspected abuse 
who is able to elicit the details from the child, or it may be 
a school counselor who is not a licensed teacher, or other 
trusted individual who is in a position to assist the 
child. . . . It would be in the best interests of abused chil-
dren if the qualifications of the witness and the reliability of 
the testimony are left to the courts to decide.243 
Despite the advantages of removing the list, m 1997, only 
241. S. 340, sec. 1, § 9-103.l (b) (2) (i) (5) (deleted from enacted bill); S. 498 amend. 
3. 
242. See generally S. 340 (enacted bill). 
243. Carolyn H. Lingeman, M.D., Statement to the Maryland House of Delegates 
Judiciary Committee (Aug. 6, 1996) (on file with author). 
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House Bill 34244 passed in the House; that bill would only have ad-
ded nurses to the list and removed the licensing requirement as to 
all listed professionals.245 In the 1998 legislative session, the Mary-
land General Assembly passed an amendment to the tender years 
statute, effective October 1, 1998, which repeals the "licensed" re-
quirement and extended the list of professionals.246 
b. Abrogate the List: The Only Sensible Solution 
In 1997, Senate Bills 132247 and 658248 and House Bills 648249 
and 98250 would have simply removed the list altogether. These bills 
also died in the House Judiciary Committee. Although the Senate 
passed Senate Bill 658, no compromise was reached in conference; 
there was no conference committee report, nor were any amend-
ments prepared by the Amendment Office for the Conference 
Committee. 
Mere piecemeal adding to the list of categories of professions 
ensures only one thing: this statute will be before the General P& 
sembly each year, because there is no logical reason to include one 
profession and not another. If psychologists and teachers are in-
cluded, why not school counselors? If physicians are included, why 
not dentists? If teachers are included, why not coaches? Why not 
Girl Scout leaders? The why nots could go on ad infinitum. 
The requirement of particular professions is unnecessary, be-
cause the statute already requires the trial judge to screen out insuf-
ficiently reliable statements.251 Moreover, the strictures of the list 
244. H.D. 34, MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 41 (i997) (full text of bill on file with au-
thor). 
245. See H.D. 34 amend. 2. Senate Bill 376 would have added only "licensed, regis-
tered nurses" to the list of possible fact witnesses. S. 376 (Md. 1997) (on file 
with author). 
246. See H.D. 590, sec. 1, § 775(b)(2)(i) (Md. 1988) (effective October 1, 1998), 
available in <http://mlis.state.md.us/1998rs/billfile/HB0590.htm> (visited 
April 20, 1998); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text. Section 777, 
with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix to this Article. 
247. S. 132 (Md. 1997) (on file with author). 
248. S. 658, MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1739 (1997) (full text of bill on file with au-
thor) . 
249. H.D. 648 (Md. 1997) (on file with author). 
250. H.D. 98, MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 77 (1997) (full text of bill on file with au-
thor) . 
251. See generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775(d) (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998) 
(listing factors the court must consider when determining if the tender years 
hearsay possesses "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"). 
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have unnecessarily caused injustices in cases involving child abuse.252 
Thus, the only sensible solution is to abrogate the list. 
V. STRIDENT ASSERTIONS THAT RECUR IN THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY 
When this writer testified in support of the tender years excep-
tion and listened to the opponents' comments-whether criminal 
defense lawyers, MSTA's lawyers, or opponents on the House Judici-
ary Committee itself-she heard several inflammatory themes 
repeated. 
A number of the opponents of the current tender years excep-
tion, or of any liberalizing amendment, have stated or implied the 
following: (1) the tender years exception is unconstitutional as it vi-
olates the Confrontation Clause; (2) children lie; (3) wives, who are 
"out to get" their husbands, make false accusations of sexual child 
abuse in virtually every child custody case and cannot be trusted to 
tell the truth; and, (4) teachers, in particular, will be sent to jail on 
the basis of false allegations. This section will respond to these as-
sertions, as well as to other arguments that have been made. 
A. Does the Current "Tender Years" Hearsay Exception Violate an Ac-
cused s Confrontation Right? Would Doing Away With the Limiting List of 
"Categories" of Witnesses Violate an Accused's Right to Confrontation? 
Maryland's tender years statute specifically incorporates the test 
that the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Idaho v. Wright,253 thus, the 
tender years statute does not violate the Confrontation Clause. In 
Wright, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that, as to non-firmly rooted 
hearsay exceptions, the mandates of the Confrontation Clause may 
be met on a case-by-case basis by a showing that the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the statement provide "adequate 'indi-
cia of reliability . . .'" or "particularized guarantees of 
252. See generally, e.g., supra notes 12-15, 90 and accompanying text (detailing case 
where tender years hearsay was excluded because the statements were made to 
a police officer). 
253. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). Compare id. at 815 (reaffirming that hearsay that does not 
fall within firmly rooted exceptions to the rule against hearsay does not violate 
the Confrontation Clause if the hearsay bears " 'particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness'" (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980»), with 
§ 775(b)(3), (d) (allowing admission of tender years hearsay "only if the state-
ment possesses particularized guarantees of trustworthiness," and listing spe-
cific considerations for the court when making this determination). 
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trustworthiness. "254 
Likewise, the proposed statute advocated in this Article is con-
stitutional.255 It would merely permit judges to look at a child's out-
of -court statement, no matter who the statement was made to, and 
evaluate it under that test, considering to whom it was made as part 
of the relevant circumstances.256 Supreme Court precedent in no 
way requires a restrictive category. 
Maryland's exception goes beyond the Supreme Court's re-
quirement by providing the following additional safeguards for an 
alleged abuser: the defense is given twenty days' notice regarding 
the statement that the proponent intends to offer;257 the court's 
hearing on the· reliability of the evidence must be conducted 
outside the presence of the jury and, in the court's discretion, 
before the seating of a jury;258 the defendant and the defendant's 
lawyer have the right to be present at this hearing;259 if the child is 
physically available, the court must conduct an in camera examina-
tion of the child before ruling on the admissibility of the evi-
dence;260 the defendant's lawyer has the right to be present at this 
examination,261 but not to question the child;262 if the court finds 
sufficient indicia of reliability, it must so rule, on the record, stating 
254. Wright, 497 u.s. at 815 (quoting Rnberts, 448 U.S. at 65). 
255. See infra Part VII. 
256. See infra Part VII. 
257. See § 775(c)(3). 
258. See id. § 775(f). 
259. See id. § 775(f) (2). 
260. See id. § 775(f) (1). 
261. See id. § 775 (f) (2)(ii). 
262. See Bayne v. State, 98 Md. App. 149, 161-63, 632 A.2d 476, 482-83 (1993) (find-
ing that the lower court properly restricted defense counsel's questioning of 
the victim at the competency hearing); see also Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 
730, 733 (1987) (excluding a criminal defendant, but not his counsel, from an 
in-chambers hearing held to determine the competency of two child witnesses 
did not violate the defendant's confrontation right or his right to due process 
because his exclusion did not interfere with his opportunity for effective cross-
examination; additionally, after each child testified on direct examination, de-
fense counsel could have asked the judge to reconsider the earlier ruling that 
the child was competent); if. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 837-38 (1990) 
(holding that a court does not have to observe the child in the presence of 
the defendant in order to find that the child cannot effectively communicate 
in the defendant's presence; such a requirement would inflict the very trauma 
the c1osed-circuit statute was intended to prevent); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 
§ 774 (1996) (amended after Craig on remand, 322 Md. 418, 588 A.2d 328 
(1991». 
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its reasons.263 If all the preceding conditions are met, the statement 
will be admissible if the child testifies at the trial. 264 If the child does 
not testifY, the statement will be inadmissible unless there is corrob-
orative evidence that the defendant had the opportunity to commit 
the alleged abuse.265 
If the statement is admitted into evidence, the witness testifYing 
to the statement may be impeached, including by showing bias. 266 
The child declarant may also be impeached, regardless whether the 
child testifies or not.267 
B. Are There Many More False Allegations of Child Abuse Made in Di-
vorce Cases Than True, or Reasonably Based, Allegations? Are Hordes of 
Mothers Maliciously Accusing Fathers? 
First, the empirical evidence does not bear out the anecdotal, 
gender-biased assertion that mothers are rampantly falsely accusing 
fathers of child sexual abuse in order to gain the upper hand in di-
vorce cases. An important study done by the American Bar Associa-
tion (ABA), in conjunction with the National Legal Research 
Center for Child Advocacy and Protection and the Association of 
Family in Conciliatory Courts, found that only 2% (169 cases) of 
the 9,000 divorce cases studied involved allegations of sexual 
abuse.268 Of those cases, Child Protective Services found only eight 
cases where allegations were malicious in nature.269 Accusations of 
sexual abuse were made not only by mothers (67%), but also by fa-
thers (28%) and third parties (11%).270 Fewer than half of these 
cases involved accusations against fathers by mothers271-less than 
1 % of the 9,000 cases studied. 
Secondly, there are obvious, legitimate reasons why good faith 
allegations would be· made during custody battles. The American 
Prosecutors Research Institute reports as follows: 
Even when allegations are made, criminal charges are rare 
in the face of widespread and misplaced cynicism about 
263. See § 775(e) (1). 
264. See MD. ANN CODE art. 27, § 775(b). 
265. See id. § 775(c)(2). 
266. See MD. RULE 5-616. 
267. See id. 5-806. 
268. See Kathleen Coulbom Faller et aI., Research on False Allegations of Sexual Abuse 
in Divorce, 6 APSAC ADVISOR, Fall 1993, at 1, 3. 
269. See id. 
270. See id. 
271. See id. 
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their validity. Allegations legitimately occur during this time 
because: (1) discovery of abuse precipitated the divorce; (2) 
separation creates opportunities and sometimes incentives 
for abuse; (3) child victims may disclose only when divorce 
is pending and the abuser is no longer in the home to en-
force silence; (4) the prospect of sole visits with the abuser 
may prompt disclosure; and (5) the nonoffending parent 
may be more likely to finally believe the child. Many times, 
a child has attempted to disclose previously but has been ig-
nored, rejected or misunderstood.272 
65 
In fact, there is evidence that mothers are initially reluctant to 
believe that their children's fathers have committed abuse.273 Ironi-
cally, when mothers come to this conclusion and make such allega-
tions, the courts tend overwhelmingly to find against them and to 
punish them for having accused the fathers.274 In her testimony at 
the United States Senate Hearing on the federal Child Victims' Bill 
of Rights Bill, Dr. Muriel Sugarman testified that cases of sexual 
child abuse are frequently mishandled by divorce courts: 
I have been directly involved in evaluation and/or 
treatment of about 21 children who were alleged to have 
been sexually abused during visitation following parental 
separation or divorce. Almost all of these allegations in~ 
volved children under age six. 
I am aware of a significant number of similar cases in 
Massachusetts and throughout the country. The magnitude 
of this problem is alarming. The management of these 
cases by the divorce courts has been inconsistent and unin-
formed at best; damaging and punitive to children and. the 
nonabusive parent at worst. 
. . . [T] he subject of child sexual abuse stirs in all of us 
painful, uncomfortable, difficult, and sometimes overwhelm-
ing feelings. The first response of those without direct expe-
rience of this topic is horror and disbelief. Yet statistics 
show that there is a veritable epidemic of sexual abuse. 
Many adults are skeptical of children's disclosures. 
They, and the nonabusing adults to whom they disclose the 
272. Reporting Child Maltreatment, American Prosecutors Research Institute, attach-
. ment 15 (statement on file with author). 
273. See id. 
274. See id. 
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abuse, are often disbelieved. This is particularly true when 
the allegations arise at the time of parental separation or 
divorce, when custody and visitation issues are being de-
cided. In part, this is because it is far easier to believe that 
a child or a reporting parent lied than to believe that an 
apparently normal adult committed the abusive behaviors 
disclosed. 
A number of allegations of sexual abuse cannot be vali-
dated or substantiated for a variety of reasons. These un-
founded allegations are often called "false." Many experts 
feel that few allegations are deliberately false. Allegations 
made out of vindictiveness or manipulativeness probably oc-
cur in no more than about 5 to 14 percent of cases. Most 
allegations are made in good faith, and the majority of 
them are true. 
The responses of divorce courts to allegations of abuse 
have been far different from the responses of the courts 
which deal with child protective issues in intact families. In 
working intensively with many of these cases, certain distinct 
and troubling patterns have emerged in the responses of 
the protective agencies and the judicial system. 
Twenty children, including four pairs of siblings, were 
alleged to have been sexually abused by their biological fa-
thers during paternal visitation after parent separation or 
divorce. 
There was only one deliberately false allegation of child 
sexual abuse by a father, and in that case the child had 
been sexually abused by a friend of the father during a pa-
ternal visit. 
In the 19 validated cases of paternal sexual abuse oc-
curring during visitation, the average age at evaluation was 
4 years, 1.5 months. The average age of disclosure was 
about 3 years, 8.5 months. The average age when the abuse 
apparently actually began was 2 years, 10.5 months. All but 
one child were under age 5 when the abuse began. 
Sixty-three percent of the abused children were female; 
37 percent were male. In 71.4 percent of families in which 
there was more than one child, one or more siblings had 
also been sexually abused by the father. 
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Only one father was indicted and prosecuted 2 years af-
ter the first allegations were made. He was acquitted. None 
of the other fathers were prosecuted. 
In 73.7 percent of the cases, the divorce court system 
did not believe the allegations. The conclusions of evalu-
ators without proper qualifications who found no evidence 
of sexual abuse were accepted over those of qualified evalu-
ators. About 58 percent of the children were inadequately 
protected from further sexual abuse, from intimidation and 
harassment by the perpetrator, and from fear of retaliation. 
Protective agency supervisors failed to be physically 
present at all times during visitation. The court or protec-
tive agency sometimes arranged supervision by parents, sib-
lings, friends, or coworkers of the alleged perpetrator who 
sometimes left the child alone with the father. 
Over half the children were forced against their will to 
have frequent, prolonged, and poorly supervised contact 
with the alleged perpetrator, regardless of the degree of 
traumatization of the child. 
Mothers were threatened with loss of custody, con-
tempt of court, and jail if they refused to comply with these 
visitation orders. 
Significantly, 53.3 percent of the mothers actually had 
great initial difficulty believing that their husband had 
abused his own child or children. 
The following recommendations refer more specifically 
to allegations of sexual abuse after parental separation or 
divorce. The most important safeguards for the child's well-
being are to protect the child from the possibility of further 
abuse; to protect the child from intimidation, retaliation, 
and pressure to recant; to protect the child from repeated 
questioning and evaluation and from repeated physical ex-
aminations for sexual abuse; to provide in a situation where 
contact between the child and the alleged perpetrator may 
be in the best interests of the child, for appropriate adult 
supervision of visitation by an objective individual with 
knowledge of child sexual abuse and clear understanding of 
the child's need for protection from abuse and 
67 
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intimidation.275 
To assist the courts m evaluating allegations of child sexual 
abuse in custody battles, the National Judicial Education Program, 
working with the ABA Center on Children and the Law, recently 
published a model judicial education curriculum.276 One of the 
most important points made in the training materials is that it is im-
perative to distinguish between a person who makes a good faith, 
but mistaken or insufficiently proven, allegation from one who de-
liberately fabricates an allegation.277 A parent who reasonably be-
lieves that someone has abused his or her child has a moral and le-
gal duty to act to protect the child and ought not be punished. 
C. Are There Many Successful False Claims, Particularly Against Teachers, 
as to Abuse of Children Under the Age of 12? 
The studies of which this writer is aware do not show that there 
is an avalanche of false or unfounded claims of abuse.278 The me-
dia's reporting of a few sensational cases, such as the McMartin case 
in California,279 overshadows its reporting of the more mundane, 
day-to-day cases of abuse, which tend to be reported in general, less 
sensational articles; for every McMartin, there are thousands of child 
abuse cases.280 
275. Child Victims' Bill of Rights: Hearings on S.B. 761 Before the Senate Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, lOlst Congo 109-11 (1989) (statement of Dr. Muriel Sugarman, Child 
Psychiatrist) . 
276. See Lynn H. Schafran, Adjudicating Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse When Custody 
is in Dispute, 81 JUDICATURE 30 (Jul.-Aug. 1997). 
277. See id. at 32-33. 
278. "A review of five studies concluded that fabricated reports occurred in 4% to 
8% of all reports." David Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and Nature 
of Child Sexual Abuse, 4 THE fuTURE OF CHILDREN 31, 43 (Summer/Fall 1994). 
Of these, the fabricated reports are "more likely to originate from adoles-
cents." Id; see also Serrato, supra note 47, at 162 (citing to studies and cases in-
dicating that only a small percentage of abuse victims fabricate). 
279. See Lois Timnick, Charges Against Buckey Dismissed--McMartin Case: After Seven 
Years and Two Trials, All Molestation Counts are Dropped, LA TiMES, Aug. 2, 1990, 
at 1; Dawn Webber, McMartin Jury Says 'Not Guilty' 52 Times-Mistrial Declared 
on 13 Counts, LA DAILY NEWS, Jan. 19, 1990, at Nl. 
280. See, e.g., Sexually Abused Teen-agers Face Tougher Rnad, THE SUN (BALT.), Oct. 1, 
1997, at AS (discussing the fact that sexual abuse often leads to a difficult 
life); Youth Offenders Sent Away, Only to Return, THE SUN (BALT.), Sept. 29, 1997, 
at Al (discussing problems with rehabilitating violent sex offenders); Powder, 
supra note 12, at B6 (reporting on the acquittal of a man who allegedly gave 
his five-year-old stepdaughter gonorrhea). 
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There do not appear to be many unwarranted convictions, long 
prison terms, or big damage awards in sexual abuse cases: 
The picture of sexual abuse in the criminal justice system 
also suggests overall a tempered rather than hysterical re-
sponse. As with most crimes, a large number of cases are 
dropped before prosecution. One study found that only 
42% of serious sexual abuse allegations (that is, those sub-
stantiated by child protection authorities and/or reported 
to the police) are actually forwarded for prosecution. More-
over, according to statistics from some selected jurisdictions, 
arrested sexual offenders against children are somewhat less 
likely to be prosecuted than are other violent offenders. 
Even when accused sex abusers are convicted, their 
sentences are not terribly stiff. Studies suggest that 32% to 
46% of convicted child sexual abusers serve no jail time. 
Only 19% receive sentences longer than one year .... 
None of this suggests that the criminal justice system aban-
dons its usual standards of operation when it comes to sex-
ual crimes against children.281 
The chief of the child abuse division of the Baltimore City State's 
Attorney's Office has stated that most of the city's prosecutions re-
sult in probation rather than prison sentences.282 
MSTA vigorously opposed broadening of the hearsay statute on 
the ground that the teachers feared they would be subject to base-
less charges.283 First, the statute under review would have had no ef-
fect on the making of out-of-court accusations regarding abuse of 
students and the stigma that such accusations may cause. Rules of 
evidence simply have no effect on the making of accusations. In ad-
dition, the Maryland General Assembly has given teachers special 
protection: the State's Attorney must review and investigate charges 
of child abuse made against teachers before those charges can be 
filed in the district court.284 
Moreover, relatively few complaints have been made against 
Maryland teachers. For example, in a total of sixty-one schools in 
128 1. Finkelhor, supra note 278, at 45 (footnotes omitted). 
282. Telephone Interview with Julie Drake, Esq. (Dec. 11, 1997). 
283. See generally text accompanying supra note 233 (quoting amendments to the 
tender years statute submitted by MSTA). 
284. See MD. CODE ANN .. CIs. & JUD. PROC. § 2-608(b), (c) (Supp. 1997). 
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Anne Arundel County, over the sixteen-year-period from 1977 to 
1993, a total of only seventy-five complaints of alleged physical or 
sexual child abuse were reported to either Protective Services or the 
police.285 Sixty-three more were investigated only within the school 
system.286 Of the total of 138 allegations in over sixteen years, it is 
unknown how many were as to children under twelve, the group af-
fected by the hearsay statute. However, only twenty-three of the 
schools were elementary schools; nine more were special schools; 
twenty-nine were middle, junior, and senior high schools.287 In How-
ard County, which has 39,000 students and 2,770 teachers, there 
were only fifteen complaints against teachers between 1995 and 
1996.288 Only four of these cases were prosecuted, three of which in-
volved children under twelve.289 
Furthermore, most child abuse-physical, sexual, and emo-
tional290-is intra-household and intra-familiaP91 To unduly hamper 
285. See Special Counse~ Anne Arundel County Dept. of Educ. Final Report (Dec. 15, 
1993). 
286. See id. 
287. See id. 
288. See Report of Child Abuse in Howard County (Oct. 6, 1997) (on file with author). 
289. See id. 
290. A striking example of emotional abuse was described in convicted murderer 
John Thanos's sentencing proceeding: 
His father was a sadist who had been treated for mental illness at the 
Perry Point veterans hospital in Harford County, according to testi-
mony, and beat Freddie Uohn] regularly from an early age; once 
punching him in the scrotum. 
But the worst abuse may have been mental. When his wife was 
working, the social worker testified, the elder Thanos would turn the 
power off in the house, then whisper eerily through the heating 
vents that he was the devil and that he was coming after Freddie. 
At night, according to the testimony, the elder Thanos would 
put sleeping pills in his wife's coffee so that he could have sex with 
his oldest daughter. The incest w:ould take place in the same bed-
room where Freddie slept, often in the same bed, with only a blanket 
separating them, the social worker said. 
As Freddie got older, his father increasingly kept the boy away 
from the house, sometimes locking Freddie out so that the elder 
Thanos could have sex with his daughter, the social worker testified, 
adding that Mrs. Thanos knew little about what was going on or 
could do little to stop it if she did know. 
Typically, psychologists say, Thanos denies all this and lionizes 
his father, who died in 1982. 
By age 12, Freddie was in trouble. He acted out in school and 
was expelled for exploding a homemade bomb on school property. 
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the protection of vulnerable children because of the unsubstanti-
ated fear of a group of adults-teachers-sets social policy on its 
head. An adult who is erroneously accused is in a far superior posi-
tion to protect himself than is a child under twelve who is being 
abused. 
D. Are Children Really Significantly Less Reliable Than Adults "When 
They Make Abuse Accusations? 
As for whether children lie, the answer is that they may lie, but 
adults also may lie.292 To exclude testimony on the basis that some-
one may lie would be to exclude all testimony. The way that we deal 
with lying witnesses or lying hearsay declarants is to impeach them, 
either through cross-examination if they testify or, if they do not 
testify, via Maryland Rule 5-806. 
The cornerstone of our judicial system is to trust the fact finder 
to evaluate the credibility of admitted evidence and give it the ap-
propriate weight. No evidence has been presented to support a con-
clusion that fact finders give undue weight to young children's out-
of-court statements. In fact, if judges and juries share the same 
prejudice against children's truthfulness that some of the outspoken 
members of the bar and legislature do, jurors will tend to evaluate 
children's statements with heightened scrutiny. 
Although those involved in the legal system may have long as-
sumed that children are more susceptible to suggestion than adults 
are, this assumption has been challenged by empirical research.293 
Officials called him "ungovernable." 
Glenn Small, Thanos: Violent, Venomous - and 'Damaged' 'Sick' Convicted Killer is 
Product of Abuse, Lawyer Says, THE SUN (BALT.), Oct. 31, 1993, at B1. 
291. See Serrato, supra note 47, at 158; see also, e.g., United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 
1362, 1366 (8th Cir. 1975) (emphasizing the need for parental testimony in 
prosecutions for child abuse because of the high incidence of child abuse in 
the home). 
292. But see supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
293. See Dominic J. Fote, Comment, Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Criminal Proceed-
ings: Their Capabilities, Special Problems, and Proposals for Reform, 13 PEPP. L. REv. 
157, 157-58 (1985). One study found: 
[C]hildren and adults ranging in age from 5 to 22 watched the ex-
perimenter and a confederate engage in a heated conversation. At 
varying intervals, those viewing the argument were asked to narrate 
exactly what they had seen, to answer objective questions about the 
incident, including a leading question, and to identify the confeder-
ate from a photo array. 
Id. at 158-59. The author cited other such experiments: 
Ninety-six subjects were tested in four groups consisting of 
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In any event, the tender years statute directs the court, when 
screening children's out-of-court statements for reliability, to look at 
whether leading questions were asked that suggested the responses 
obtained.294 If so, this would be one indicium of unreliability.295 
E. Why Not Require That the Out-of Court Statement be Audiotaped or 
Videotaped? 
In Idaho v. Wright,296 the Supreme Court implied that taping is 
not mandated by the Constitution.297 For practical reasons, a taping 
requirement would be unwise. Taping equipment costs money and 
is not universally available. Taping also implies that we knew what 
twenty-four per group. The four groups were comprised of the fol-
lowing subjects, respectively: kindergarten and first graders, third and 
fourth graders, seventh and eighth graders, and college students. 
They were tested individually in a small room where the confederate 
stormed in, argued with the experimenter over the use of the room, 
then stormed out. The duration of a subject's exposure to the con-
federate was fifteen seconds, from a distance of approximately seven 
feet. At intervals of ten or thirty minutes, the subjects were evaluated 
on free recall, direct questions including one leading question, and 
photo identification. Two weeks later, the subjects returned and were 
reassessed, this time using a non-leading question. 
[d. at 159 n.8. 
Results indicated that very young children were as capable as adults in 
answering direct questions about the incident. Also, young children scored as 
well as adults in identifying from a photo array. Perhaps most surprising was 
the data indicating that children were no more easily swayed to answer incor-
rectly by the use of leading questions thim were adults. One finding did indi-
cate that children were not as capable as adults to freely articulate their ver-
sion of what occurred. Nonetheless, while the youngest children tended to say 
little, what they did say was three times more likely to be accurate than what 
the adults said. 
The Marin study concluded that the main problem with young witnesses 
is not their ability to accurately perceive events, but their ability to accurately 
and meaningfully report their perceptions. Given certain external prompts 
and cues, however, "the young witness would be expected to perform quite 
adequately." In the final analysis, "it would seem, then, that children as young 
as five years of age are no less competent or credible as eyewitnesses than are 
adults when responding to direct objective questions." 
[d. at 159 (citing Marin, Holmes, Guth & Kovac, The Potential of Children as Eye-
witnesses, 3 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 295 (1979) (footnotes omitted». 
294. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (d) (4) (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). Section 
775, with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix to this Article. 
295. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
296. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
297. See supra Part II. 
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the subject of the statement would be beforehand: that is why we 
taped it. A taping requirement could lead to the consideration by 
the court of only a less spontaneous and less reliable statement than 
the statements that preceded the taping. Surely it is nonsensical to 
restrict the court from considering the most reliable and most spon-
taneous statements. 
VI. COMPARISON OF MARYLAND'S CURRENT STATUTE TO 
SPECIFIC TENDER YEARS EXCEPTIONS OF OTHER STATES 
It is useful to compare Maryland's tender years exception to 
those of the thirty-eight other states that have specific tender years 
exceptions.298 
A. Constitutionality 
The state courts that have ruled on the question have upheld 
the constitutionality of their tender years exceptions, except for de-
cisions in Arizona and Mississippi that were based on a finding that 
the legislatures had exceeded their powers and trod on the judici-
ary's power.299 Subsequently, Mississippi enacted a tender years rule 
of court.300 
B. Applicability to which Out-of Court Declarants 
The Maryland statute applies only to the child victim of certain 
crimes, abus<;!, or neglect.301 At least seven states extend the tender 
years exception to child witnesses other than the victim himself.302 
The proposed statute set forth in Part VII of this Article would simi-
larly extend the Maryland statute. 
Maryland's exception applies only to statements made by chil-
dren under twelve years of age.303 Six states extend the tender years 
298. See infra notes 399400. 
299. See State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801 (Az. 1987); Mitchell v. State, 539 So. 2d 
1366 (Miss. 1989). 
300. See MISS. R EVID. 803(25). 
301. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (b) (1) (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). Section 
775, with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix to this Article. 
302. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1975); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (West 1989); 
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 3513(a) (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(22) (West 1979); N.D. R EVID. 
803(24); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-16-38 (Michie 1995). Rhode Island's and 
South Carolina's statutes could also be read to this effect. See RI. GEN. LAws 
§ 14-1-69 (1994); S.c. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997). 
303. See § 775(b). Section 775, with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix to 
this Article. 
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exception to persons of similar mental development due to retarda-
tion, disability, or senility.304 The proposed statute set forth in Part 
VII of this Article would similarly extend the Maryland statute. 
C. Availability or Unavailability of Declarant to Testify 
Maryland's statute applies "regardless of whether the child testi-
fies. "305 Seven states' exceptions apply if the child is either available 
to testify or unavailable.306 These are exceptions most similar to Ma-
ryland's.307 Other states, with only residual exceptions, also would 
permit sufficiently reliable hearsay regardless whether the declarant 
is available to testify. The proposed statute set forth in Part VII of 
this Article retains Maryland's current approach, which is also that 
of Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-803. 
Nineteen states' provisions apply if the child actually testifies at 
the proceeding (or by closed-circuit television) or is unavailable to 
testify.308 Six states' exceptions apply only if the child testifies or is 
available to testify.309 Six states' provisions apply only if the child is 
unavailable to testify. 310 
304. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(22) (West 1979); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/115-
10 (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1998); MISS. R 
EVID. 803(25); OR. R EVID. 803(18a)(b); VT. R EVID. 804a(a) (including men-
tally-ill adults). 
305. § 775(c). 
306. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.96 (West 1994); MISS. R EVID. 803(25); N.H. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 516:25-a (Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West 
Supp. 1998); RI. GEN. LAws § 14-1-69 (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 
(1995) . 
307. See infra Part VII for a discussion of Maryland law. 
308. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1995); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (West 1989); 
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
§ 3513(a) (1995); FlA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(22) (West 1979); IDAHO CODE § 19-
3024 (1997); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/115-10 (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-37-40 (Michie 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1998); 
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075 (West 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51.385 (Michie 
Supp. 1997); NJ. R. CT. 803(27); N.D. CT. RuL. 803(24); OR. R. CT. 
803(18a)(b); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985.1 (West Supp. 1997); S.c. CODE 
ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-16-38 
(Michie 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:2 (Michie 1995); WASH. REv. CODE 
ANN. § 9A.44.120 (West Supp. 1998). 
309. See AIA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 803(25) (Michie 1997) 
(prior inconsistent statement only); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-16 (1995); MICH. R 
EVID. 803A (prior consistent statement only); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 
38.072 (West Supp. 1998); VT. R EVID. 804a(a). 
310. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1995); HAw. CT. R. 804(6); RAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-460(dd) (Supp. 1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (West 1997); 
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D. Corroboration Requirement 
If the child does not testify at the trial, Maryland requires cor-
roboration of the alleged abuser's opportunity to commit the 
abuse. 311 Seventeen states similarly require corroborative evidence 
only if the child is unavailable to testify.3I2 Maryland's requirement 
is broader, however, because it applies not only if the child is un-
available to testify, but also if the child is available, but does not 
testify.313 
Seven states specify that the corroboration required is of the 
act of abuse or neglect.314 Oregon requires corroboration of both 
the abuse and the alleged abuser's opportunity to commit the 
abuse. 315 California's very limited exception only permits the evi-
dence to corroborate an accused's confession and the evidence 
must be in the form of a written report of a law enforcement of-
ficer or a county welfare employee.316 Michigan only permits tender 
years hearsay evidence if the child testifies consistently with it.317 
The proposed statute set forth in Part VII of this Article retains Ma-
ryland's current approach. 
MAss GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 81(b)(West Supp. 1997); OHIO REv. CODE 
ANN. EVID. R 807 (Banks-Baldwin 1994). 
311. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). Section 775, 
with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix to this Article. 
312. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1995); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (West 1995); 
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(22) 
(West 1979); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024 (1997); 725 ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-10 
(West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1998); MISS. R EVID. 
803(25); NJ. R EVID. 803(27); N.D. R EvlD. 803(24); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 
EVID. R 807 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West 
Supp. 1998); OR R EVID. 803(18a)(b) (only required in a criminal trial); 42 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985.1 (West Supp. 1997); S.c. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 
(Law Co-op. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-16-38 (Michie 1995); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5411 (1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44-120 (West Supp. 1998). 
313. See § 775(c) (2). 
314. See NJ. R EVID. 803(27); N.D. R EVID. 803(24); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 
§ 2803.1 (West 1993); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985.1 (West 1982); S.D. CaDI· 
FIED LAws § 19-16-38 (Michie 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5411 (1995); WASH. 
REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44-120 (West Supp. 1998). 
315. See OR R EVID. 803(18a) (b). 
316. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1995). 
317. See MICH. R EVID. 803A. 
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E. Pretrial Notice 
Twenty-three states, including Maryland, impose an across-the-
board pretrial notice requirement when a child victim's out-of-court 
statement is going to be offered into evidence.318 On the other 
hand, Nevada requires notice, but only if the child is unavailable to 
testify.319 The proposed statute set forth in Part VII of this Article re-
tains Maryland's current approach. 
F. Defense's Ability to Take Deposition 
No state, other than Maryland, provides that the defense has 
the right to take the deposition of the witness who will testify to the 
child's statement.320 The proposed statute set forth in Part VII of 
this Article would abrogate this right. 
C. Limitation as to Who Can Testify to the Child's Statement 
Of the thirty-nine states that rely on specific tender years excep-
tions, as opposed to catch-all provisions, thirty-four do not create a 
requirement as to the professions of those to whom the child's 
statement has been made, electing instead to provide for a case-by-
case determination of the reliability of the statement.321 Of course, 
318. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-35 (1995); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416(B). (West 
1989); ARK. R EVID. 803(25); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129 (West 1997); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513(d) (1995); FlA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23)(b) 
(West 1979 & Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024 (1997); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. 
ANN. 5/115-10 (d) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6(e) 
(West 1992 & Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1(3) 
(1995); MICH. R EVID. 803A(4); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3) (c) (West 1988); 
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075(3) (West 1996); NJ. R EVID. 803(27)(a); OKlA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1B (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 5985.1(b) (West 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180(c) (Law Co-op. Supp. 
1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-16-38 (Michie 1995); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. 
art. 38.072(2) (b)(l) (A) (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (3) 
(Supp. 1995); VT. R EvlD. 804a(a); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:2 C (Michie 
1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44-120 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998). 
319. See NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51.385(2) (1985). 
320. See MD. ANN CODE art. 27, § 775 (c) (4) (i) (Supp. 199,7) (amended 1998). 
321. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1995); AIAsKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Michie 1995); ARIz. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (West 1989); ARK. R EVID. 803(25); CAL. EVID. CODE 
§ 1228 (West 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129(3) (West 1997); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-16 (1995); HAw. R 
EVID. 804(b) (6); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024 (1997); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/ 
115-10 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Michie 1994 & 
Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.96 (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-460(dd) (1994 & Supp. 1997); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 81 (West 
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those additional states with only general residual hearsay exceptions 
do not limit potential witnesses at all. 
In addition, five states have sui generis restrictions. California's 
statute admits only a written report of a law enforcement officer or 
a welfare employee.322 Iowa's statute creates a narrow tender years 
exception that applies to CINA proceedings only.323 The Iowa stat-
ute requires that there be either a writing, audiotape, or videotape 
made by "a juvenile court officer, a peace officer, or a hospital. "324 
Other states create additional artificial restrictions in their stat-
utes. For instance, South Carolina restricts the testimony of a child's 
statement only when the statement alleges abuse or neglect by one 
of his parents, and the allegation of abuse or neglect is made after 
the parents' separation or divorce.325 Even in those cases, the state-
ment is admissible only if it was made by the child "to a law en-
forcement official, an officer of the court, a licensed family coun-
selor or therapist, a physician or other health care provider, a 
teacher, a school counselor, a Department of Social Services staff 
member, or to a child care worker in a regulated child care 
facility. "326 
Texas limits its tender years hearsay witness to the first person, 
eighteen years or older, to whom the child made a statement about 
the offense.327 This provision makes the tender years exception 
somewhat analogous to Maryland's exception for a prompt report 
of rape or sexual assault,328 and permits the first allegation by the 
Supp. 1997); MICH. R EVID. 803A; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3) (West 1988); 
MISS. R EVID. 803(25); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075 (West 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 51.385 (1985 & Supp. 1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 516:25-a (Supp. 
1995); NJ. R EVID. 803(27); NY FAM. CT. ACT. § 1046 (McKinney 1983); N.D. 
R EVID. 803(24); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. EVID. R 807 (Banks-Baldwin 1995 & 
Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West 1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 5985.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997); RI. GEN. LAws § 14-1-69 (1994); S.c. 
CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-16-38 
(Michie 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5411 (1995); VT. R EvlD. 804a(a); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:2 (Michie 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44-120 
(West 1988 & Supp. 1998). 
322. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1995). 
323. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.96(6) (West 1996). 
324. [d. 
325. See S.c. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180(G) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997). 
326. [d. 
327. See TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 38.072(2) (a)(2) (West Supp. 1998). Presuma-
bly others could testify to the child's subsequent consistent statements if the 
child is impeached by suggestion of fabrication or improper motive. 
328. See MD. RULE 5-802.1 (d). 
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child to be admitted into evidence.329 
Focusing on the relationship of the witness to the child, Rhode 
Island requires that the statement be "made to someone the child 
would normally turn to for sympathy, protection or advice."33o This 
provision, of course, is not a restriction on professions. It would 
seem to broadly include parents, siblings, friends, law enforcement 
officers, health services and social services workers, school person-
nel, the clergy, and any other person to whom the child may 
turn.331 The proposed statute set forth in Part VII of this Article fol-
lows the lead of the thirty-four states that omit the restrictive list.332 
It also incorporates the language of the Rhode Island statute as a 
factor to be looked at by the court in determining reliability.333 
H. Types of Proceedings That the Exceptions are Applicable to 
States that have specific tender years exceptions vary widely as 
to which types of proceedings their exception applies. The states 
fall within the following eleven categories: (1) any judicial proceed-
ing-Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oregon, and Vermont (also permitted in administrative proceed-
ings);334 (2) any criminal or civil proceeding-Arizona, Florida, and 
Minnesota;335 (3) criminal, juvenile, or civil proceeding-New 
Jersey;336 (4) criminal, delinquency, or civil proceedings-Colo-
rado;337 (5) criminal, delinquency, or child protection proceed-
ings-Kansas and Washington;338 (6) criminal or juvenile proceed-
ings-Oklahoma;339 (7) criminal or delinquency proceedings-
Michigan;340 (8) criminal proceedings-Alabama, Arkansas, Califor-
nia, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, Penn-
sylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah;341 (9) grand jury hear-
ings-Alaska;342 (10) civil proceedings-New Hampshire and 
329. See TEX. CODE. CRIM. P. ANN. art. 38.072 (West Supp. 1998). 
330. R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-69 (1994). 
331. See id. 
332. See supra note 321. 
333. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-69 (1994). 
334. See infra notes 399-400. 
335. See infra notes 399-400. 
336. See NJ. R EVID. 803(27). 
337. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129 (West 1997). 
338. See infra notes 399-400. . 
339. See infra note 400. 
340. See infra note 399. 
341. See infra notes 399-400. 
342. See ALAsKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Michie 1985). 
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Virginia;343 (11) child protection hearing-Iowa, Michigan, New 
York (family court), Rhode Island (custody or termination), and 
South Carolina (family court).344 The proposed statute set forth in 
Part VII of this Article would make the exception applicable in 
criminal, civil, and juvenile proceedings. 
/. Timing of Admissibility Determination 
Several states do not specify when and where the trial court 
must make the preliminary determination as to admissibility. How-
ever, many require an in camera determination. For example, New 
Jersey requires a "hearing conducted pursuant to [Evidence] Rule 
104(a),"345 which provides that the court "may hear" the matter 
outside the presence of the jury.346 Michigan requires a pretrial de-
termination;347 North Dakota requires an in limine hearing;348 and 
Oregon requires a determination "immediately prior to the com-
mencement of trial. "349 
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR AMENDING MARYlAND'S STATUTE 
The following proposed statute is based on Senate Bill 658350 
from the 1997 session. Some changes have been made, and foot-
notes have been added. The proposed statute would extend the 
tender years exception in the following ways: (1) extend the excep-
tion to civil proceedings; (2) make the exception applicable to child 
witnesses to abuse of other children, such as siblings, when their 
out-of-court statements are shown to be reliable; (3) make the ex-
ception applicable to older retarded or developmentally disabled 
persons who have a mental or developmental age of under 12 and, 
therefore, need protection; and (4) omit the list of categories of 
professions of witnesses, who can testify. 
The proposed statute provides that screening by the judge 
could be held, in the court's discretion, before the seating of a jury. 
As mandated in Idaho v. Wright,351 the criteria used for determining 
the reliability of tender years hearsay are modified to preclude the 
343. See infra note 400. 
344. See infra notes 399400. 
345. NJ. R EVID. 803(27). 
346. Id. 104(a). 
347. See MICH. R EVID. 803A. 
348. See N.D. R EVID. 803(24). 
349. OR R EVID. 803(18a) (b). 
350. S. 658 (Md. 1997) (on file with author). 
351. 497 U.S. 805, 806 (1990). 
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judge from either considering corroborating evidence or judging 
the credibility of the witness testifying to the child's statement; in-
stead, these issues are properly left to the trier of fact. Moreover, 
the criterion included in the Rhode Island statute regarding per-
sons from whom the child likely would seek solace, protection, or 
advice,352 is added as an indicium of reliability. 
A BILL ENTITLED353 
AN ACT concerning 
Child Abuse - Out of Court Statements 
FOR the purpose of expanding a provision of law that allows 
certain out-of-court statements concerning alleged offenses against 
certain child victims to be admitted in certain court proceedings by 
allowing these statements to be offered in" civil proceedings if found 
to be sufficiently reliable; and generally relating to the use of cer-
tain out of court statements concerning certain offenses in court 
proceedings. 
BY repealing Article 27 - Crimes and Punishments Section 775 
Annotated Code of Maryland (1996 Replacement Volume) and re-
enacting it with amendments, as Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article Section 9-103.1 
SECTION 1. BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
OF MARYLAND, That the Laws of Maryland read as follows: 
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article Section 9-103.1 
(a) In this section "statement" means: 
(1) An oral or written assertion; or 
(2) Nonverbal conduct, if it is intended as an assertion, includ-
ing sounds, gestures, demonstrations, drawings, or similar 
actions.354 
(b) (1) Subject to the provisions of [paragraphs (2) and (3)] PARA-
GRAPH (2) of this subsection, if a court finds that the requirements 
of subsection (c) of this section are satisfied, a court may admit into 
evidence in a juvenile [court proceeding], CML, or [in a] criminal 
352. See supra notes 330-31 and accompanying text. 
353. Language deleted from the statute currently in force, including amendments 
effective October I, 1998, see supra notes II, 246 and accompanying text, are 
placed in [brackets], and added language is CAPITALIZED. 
354. This definition could be removed and replaced with a cross-reference to Mary-
land Rule of Evidence 5-801 (a). However, having the explanation in subsec-
tion (a) (2) may be helpful to the courts. 
o 
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court proceeding an out-of-court statement, to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted in the statement, made by a child [victim]355 
WHEN356 under the age of twelve357 years, who is EITHER the al-
leged victim or the child alleged to need assistance in the case 
before the court, concerning an alleged offense against the child, 
OR A WITNESS TO SUCH AN OFFENSE AGAINST ANOTHER 
CHILD,358 of: 
(i) Child abuse OR ABUSE OF A VULNERABLE ADULT,359 
as defined in ARTICLE 27, Sections 35C and 35D [of this 
article] ; 
(ii) Rape or sexual offense, as defined in ARTICLE 27, Sec-
tions 462 through 464B [of this article]; 
(iii)Attempted rape or attempted sexual offense in the first 
or second degree, as defined in ARTICLE 27, Section 464F 
[of this article]; or 
(iv) In a juvenile OR CIVIL court proceeding, abuse or 
neglect as defined in Section 5-701 of the Family Law 
Article.360 
(2) FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION, A "CHILD" SHALL IN-
CLUDE A PERSON WHO IS CHRONOLOGICALLY TWELVE 
YEARS OR OLDER, BUT HAS A MENTAL OR DEVELOPMENTAL 
AGE OF UNDER TWELVE, BECAUSE OF MENTAL RETARDA-
TION OR DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, AS DEFINED IN Mary-
land Annotated Code, Health-General I Sections 7-101 (1) and 7-
101 (e).361 
355. This proposed statute extends the exception to child witnesses of abuse or 
negligence of other children, e.g., their siblings. 
356. This is intended to clarifY that the child must be under twelve when the out-
of -court statement was made; the child does not necessarily have to be under 
twelve at the time of trial. 
357. This proposed statute does not attempt to change the cut-ofI age of twelve or 
older. However, other states vary widely on this policy question. 
358. See supra note 302 and accompanying text (proposing that the exception also 
extends to child witnesses of alleged child abuse). 
359. See supra note 304 and accompanying text (extending the exception to vulner-
able adults). 
360. This proposed statute does not address whether the events to which the 
child's statement pertains should be broadened, e.g., to include all crimes. See 
Andrea J. Sedlak, Ph.D. & Diane D. Braodhurst, M.L.A., Executive Summary of 
the Third National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect, at 18-21 (Sept. 
1996) (report on file with author). 
361. See supra note 304 and accompanying text (proposing that the exception also 
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[(2) An out of court statement may be admissible under this section 
only if: 
(i) The statement was made to and is offered by: 
1. A physician; 
2. A psychologist; 
3. A nurse; 
4. A social worker; 
5. A principal, vice principal, teacher, or school counselor 
at a public or private preschool, elementary school, or 
secondary school; and 
(ii) The individual described under item (i) of this paragraph 
was lawfully acting in the course of the individual's profession 
when the statement was made.J362 
(2) An out-of-court statement may be admissible under this section 
only if [the statement possesses particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.] 363 
THE COURT FINDS, IN A HEARING CONDUCTED OUTSIDE 
THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY OR, IN THE COURT'S DISCRE-
TION, BEFORE THE SEATING OF A JURY,364 THAT THE TIME, 
CONTENT, AND CIRCUMSTANCES SUPPORTING THE MAKING 
OF THE STATEMENT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF RELIA-
BILITY TO PERMIT ITS ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE.365 THE 
COURT SHALL MAKE A FINDING ON THE RECORD AS TO 
THE SPECIFIC INDICIA OF RELIABILITY, SET FORTH IN SUB-
SECTION (D), THAT ARE PRESENT OR ABSENT IN THE 
STATEMENT. 366 
(c) (I)Under this section, an out-of-court statement by a child 
may come into evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted in the statement[: 
(i) If the child's statement is not admissible under any 
other hearsay exception;367 and 
extends to vulnerable adults). 
362. See supra note 321. 
363. In the proposed amendment, the list of categories is removed. 
364. For clarity, section (e) of the current statute is moved here and specific lan-
guage is added, granting flexibility and direction to the trial judge regarding 
whether the determination mayor must be made prior to jury selection. But 
see infra part VIII. 
365. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 815-17 (1990). 
366. By creating a record of the judge'S determination, this section facilitates ap-
pellate·review. 
367. This provision is omitted because of the adoption of the Maryland Rules of Evi-
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(ii) Regardless] REGARDLESS of whether the child 
testifies. 
(2) If the child does not testifY, the child's out of court state-
ment will be admissible only if there is corroborative evidence 
that: 
(i) The defendant in a criminal proceeding had the oppor-
tunity to commit the alleged offense; or 
(ii) The alleged offender in a juvenile court OR CIVIL 
proceeding had the opportunity to commit the alleged 
abuse or neglect.368 
(3) In order to provide [the defendant withJ369 an opportunity 
to prepare a response to the statement, the [prosecutor] PRO-
PONENT OF THE EVIDENCE shall serve on the [defendant,] 
ADVERSE PARTY in a criminal proceeding or [on the alleged 
offender] in a juvenile370 court proceeding [and the alleged of-
fender's attorney], a reasonable time before the juvenile court 
proceeding and at least twenty days before the criminal pro-
ceeding in which the statement is to be offered into evidence, 
notice of: 
(i) The [State's] PROPONENT'S intention to introduce 
the statement; and 
(ii) The content of the statement. 
UNLESS PROVIDED OTHERWISE BY PRETRIAL ORDER, THE 
SAME NOTICE AND SERVICE DESCRIBED IN THIS SUBSEC-
TION SHALL BE PROVIDED, AT LEAST TWENTY DAYS BEFORE 
TRIAL, TO ALL PARTIES IN A CIVIL PROCEEDING.371 
dence. If the provision was retained, the court would have to decide that the 
evidence was inadmissible under the residual exceptions before it could con-
sider the statutory exception-an illogical manner of proceeding, to say the 
least. 
368. This proposed statute retains subsection (c) (2), which adds a second condi-
tion to admissibility when the child does not testifY, even though the state-
ment must have been found to be reliable by the judge after consideration of 
the factors in subsection (d). MSTA proposed to omit subsection (c)(2), but 
not subsection (d)(lO), see MSTA, supra note 231, 1: 5, perhaps because they 
misread Idaho v. Wright. Realistically, a reasonable prosecutor would not pro-
ceed without the evidence required by subsection (c) (2). 
369. The abuser may not be the defendant. However, the abuser could be a juve-
nile offender, a CINA, or an employee of the defendant. 
370. This change is made in recognition of the fact that the accused may wish to 
offer an out-of-court statement of the child into evidence. 
371. The notice requirement is extended to civil proceedings; nonetheless, the 
abuser might not be a party. 
84 
(d) 
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[(4) (i) The alleged offender shall have the right to take the 
deposition of a witness who will testify under this section; 
(ii) Unless the State and the defendant or respondent 
agree, or the court orders otherwise, the defendant in a 
criminal proceeding shall file a notice of deposition at 
least five days before, or in a juvenile court proceeding 
within a reasonable time before, the date of the deposi-
tion; and 
(iii) Except where inconsistent with this paragraph, the 
provisions of Maryland Rule 4-261 shall apply to a deposi-
tion taken under this paragraph.]3n 
In order to determine if a child's statement possesses [particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness] SUFFICIENT INDICIA 
OF RELIABILI'J'Y373 under this section, the court shall consider 
[, but is not limited to,] the following factors: 374 
(1) The child's personal knowledge of the event;375 
[(2) The certainty that the statement was made;]376 
[(3)] (2) Any apparent motive OR LACK OF MOTIVE to 
fabricate or exhibit partiality by the child, including inter-
est, bias, corruption, or coercion; 
[(4)] (3) Whether the statement was spontaneous [or di-
rectly responsive to questions] ;377 
[(5)] (4) The timing of the statement; 
[(6) Whether] (5) THE CONTENT OF THE STATE-
MENT, INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE,378 WHETHER the 
372. The deposition provision is removed because it contravenes the purpose of 
the tender years exception. Moreover, prosecutors have suggested that the 
deposition provision discourages them from using the tender years exception. 
373. This language conforms to the language in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 
(1990), and is clearer than the language in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 
(1980), which is contained in the current statute. 
374. This language is omitted in light of Wright, 497 U.S. at 820-21 (determining 
the reliability of the statement by considering the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the statement). See also supra Part II. 
375. This should be met by a showing sufficient to support a finding by a jury that 
the child had personal knowledge. See MD. RULE 5-602. 
376. This factor seems to impermissibly require the court to evaluate the credibility 
of the witness testifying to the child's statement. See infra Part VII.D. (criticiz-
ing the current statute, which directs the judge to evaluate the credibility of 
the witness in child abuse cases as a factor in determining the reliability of the 
statement) . 
377. The omitted language is superfluous. 
378. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 822. 
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child's young age makes it unlikely that the child 
fabricated the statement that represents a graphic, detailed 
account beyond [the] AN UNABUSED379 child's knowledge 
and experience and the appropriateness of the terminol-
ogy to the child's age; 
[(7)] (6) The nature and duration of the ALLEGED 
abuse; 
[(8)] (7) The inner consistency and coherence of the 
statement; 
[(9)] (8) Whether the child was suffering pain or distress 
when making the statement; 
[( 10) Whether extrinsic evidence exists to show the 
defendant's opportunity to commit the act complained of 
in the child's statement;380 
(11)] (9) Whether the SUBSTANCE OF THE statement [is 
suggestive due to] WAS SUGGESTED BY the use of lead-
ing questions[;] 
(10) WHETHER THE PERSON TO WHOM THE STATE-
MENT WAS MADE IS ONE TO WHOM THE CHILD 
NORMALLY WOULD TURN FOR PROTECTION, SOL-
ACE, OR ADVICE.381 
[(12)] (11) The credibility of the person testifying about 
the statement]. 
IN MAKING THIS DETERMINATION, THE COURT SHALL NOT 
CONSIDER WHETHER THERE IS INDEPENDENT PROOF OF 
THE ALLEGED ACT. 382 
[( e) The court, in determining whether a statement is admissible 
under this section, in a hearing outside the presence of the jury, or 
before the juvenile court proceeding shall: 
(1) Make a finding on the record as to the specific guarantees 
of trustworthiness that are present in the statement; and 
(2) Determine the admissibility of the statement. 
(f)] (E)(l) In making a determination under subsection [(e)] 
(B) (2) of this section, the court shall conduct an in camera exami-
nation of a child prior to determining the admissibility of the state-
ment, except where the child: 
379. Added for clarity. 
380. The holding in Wright requires removal of this criterion for reliability. See 
Wright, 497 U.S. at 824. 
381. See supra notes 330-331 and accompanying text. 
382. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 824. 
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(i) Has died; or 
(ii) Is absent from the jurisdiction for good cause shown 
or the State OR CIVIL PARTY OFFERING THE EVI-
DENCE has been unable to procure the child's presence 
by subpoena or other reasonable means. 
(2)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii)2 of this para-
graph, any [defendant] PARTY, any [defendant's] PARTYS at-
torney, and the prosecutor shall have the right to be present 
when the court hears testimony on whether to admit into evi-
dence an out-of-court statement of a child under this section. 
(ii) If the court is required to observe or question the 
child in connection with the determination to admit into 
evidence the out-of-court statement: 
1. Any defendant's attorney and the prosecutor OR 
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY shall have the right to be pres-
ent at the in camera examination; and 
2. The judge may not permit a defendant OR ALLEGED 
ABUSER to be present at the in camera examination.383 
[ (g)] (F) (1) This section may not be construed to limit the admissi-
bility of a statement under any other applicable hearsay exception 
or rule of evidence. 
(2) This section may not be construed to prohibit the court in 
a juvenile court proceeding from hearing testimony in the 
judge's chambers. 
SECTION 2. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act shall 
take effect October 1, 1999. 
A. lVhy Extend the Exception to Apply to Civil Proceedings? 
When present Chief Judge Joseph Murphy and then Chief 
Judge Alan Wilner of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland tes-
tified before the House Judiciary Committee during the 1996 inter-
session, they both expressed surprise that Maryland's tender years 
statute did "not extend to civil proceedings generally. They stated 
that if the evidence is good enough for criminal proceedings, it is 
certainly good enough for civil proceedings and that the statute, 
therefore, should be broadened. 
The tender years exceptions of fifteen other states extend to 
383. Added in recognition that there may be cases where a child care facility is be-
ing sued for the negligent hiring of a child abuser, so that even though the 
defendant may not have abused the child, the alleged abuser will not be per-
mitted at the in camera examination. 
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civil proceedings in general.384 An amendment to this effect would 
perhaps enable cases that now are being criminally prosecuted to be 
handled more appropriately in noncriminal proceedings, such as 
child custody or visitation proceedings or civil proceedings seeking 
a protective order. It would also enable the courts to protect chil-
dren in cases where proof of abuse by the alleged abuser could not 
be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, but the preponderance of the 
evidence standard was met. In this situation, we have a duty to pro-
tect our children when they are in danger. 
B. Why Does the Proposed Statute not Require the Proponent of the Hear-
say Evidence to Call the Child as a Witness if the Child is Available to 
Testify? 
The opponents' argument that the child should have to testifY 
if available is yet another attempt to treat tender years hearsay as 
particularly dangerous. However, there is no justification for man-
dating young children to take the stand. 
As is the case with the more than twenty Maryland Rule 5-803 
hearsay exceptions, if a child's out-of-court statement is sufficiently 
reliable to be admissible under the tender years hearsay exception, 
the party offering the statement ought not be compelled to call the 
child to testifY. This decision should be left to trial strategy and the 
conscience of the proponent, who may not want to put the child 
through the added stress of testifYing.385 
The opposing party has an equal opportunity to examine the 
child victim. If the child is available, the opposing party can sub-
poena the child and examine him just as that party can do with any 
available hearsay declarant. Moreover, Maryland Rule 5-607 permits 
one to impeach one's own witness. 386 If calling the declarant as 
one's own witness is undesirable, that party may ask the court to call 
the child as the court's witness, thus allowing both sides to proceed 
as if on cross-examination.387 
The Maryland statute has no constitutional infirmity. The Su-
preme Court has held that the Constitution does not require that 
the State produce the child- at trial or prove him or her to be 
384. See supra Part VI.H. (Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Ore-
gon, Vennont, Virginia). 
385. See generally Serrato, supra note 47, at 159-60. 
386. See MD. RULE 5-607. 
387. See id. 5-614. 
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unavailable.388 
Moreover, if the child is physically available, the statute re-
quires the court to conduct an in camera examination of the child 
before ruling on the admissibility of the child's out-of-court state-
ment. 389 If the child does not testify, the Maryland statute also re-
quires that there be corroborating evidence of the alleged abuser's 
opportunity to commit the offense.390 
c. Why Does the Proposed Statute Eliminate the Requirement That the 
Trial Court, in Performing its Screening Function, Evaluate the Credibility 
of the Person Testifying About the Statement, Including the Court's Certainty 
That the Statement was Made? 
Another infirmity in the current statute results because it sin-
gles out child abuse cases for special scrutiny by directing the trial 
judge to evaluate the credibility of the witness who is testifying to 
the child's statement. What is relevant to the trial judge's findings 
as to the preliminary facts of admissibility of hearsay is the reliability 
of the out-of-court declarant, established through the foundation 
for each hearsay exception, not the credibility of the in-court wit-
nesses. Motive to lie or bias does not preclude a witness from testify-
ing to admissible hearsay in other situations. 
If the husband of a rape victim wishes to testify to his wife's 
prompt report of rape, the judge does not look to see if the hus-
band has bias before permitting the husband to testify. Similarly, if 
an employee of a business wishes to testify to lay the foundation for 
a self-serving business record, the judge does not preclude the em-
ployee from testifying on the basis of the witness's bias. 
Under the old common law, parties in civil cases, and their 
spouses, were incompetent to testify because of their interest in the 
outcome.391 Criminal defendants were incompetent to testify for the 
same reason.392 Maryland abrogated that common law rule by stat-
ute.393 Under the current statutory regime, the formerly disqualify-
ing fact may simply be brought out to impeach.394 
388. See supra Part III, B. 2. 
389. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775(f) (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). Section 
775, with amendments; is reprinted in the Appendix to this Article. 
390. See § 775(c) (2). 
391. See MCCORMICK, supra note 123, § 65-66. 
392. 6 MCLAIN, supra note 70, § 607.1. 
393. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-101 (1995). 
394. See id. 
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In directing whether to believe the witness's testimony, the fact 
finder will consider, inter alia, a witness's bias. In fact, Maryland 
Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions 3: 10 provides: 
You are the sole judge of whether a witness should be be-
lieved. In making this decision, you may apply your own 
common sense and every day experiences. 
In determining whether a witness should be believed, 
you should carefully judge all the testimony and evidence 
and the circumstances under which the witness testified. 
You should consider such factors as: 
(1) the witness's behavior on the stand and manner of 
testifying; 
(2) did the witness appear to be telling the truth? 
(3) the witness's opportunity to see or hear the things 
about which testimony was given; 
(4) the accuracy of the witness's memory; 
(5) does the witness have a motive not to tell the 
truth? 
(6) does the witness have an interest in the outcome of 
the case? 
(7) was the witness's testimony consistent? 
(8) was the witness's testimony supported or contra-
dicted by evidence that you believe? and 
(9) whether and the extent to which the witness's testi-
mony in the court differed from the statements 
made by the witness on any previous occasion. 
You need not believe any witness, even if the testimony 
is uncontradicted. You may believe all, part or, none of the 
testimony of any witness.395 
There is nothing unique in this: it is inherent in the fact find-
ing mission of our judicial system. This is the role of the fact finder: 
the jury in a jury trial, the court in a bench trial. As then Chief 
Judge Wilner wrote in Kline v. Green Mount Cemetery:396 
Courts are constantly called upon to decide, from conflict-
ing evidence, what is fact. That, indeed, is their daily fare. 
They have, of course, no firsthand knowledge of what is 
fact-who really had the green light, whether it was the 
395. MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATfERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3:10 (1995); accard MARYLAND 
CIVIL PATfERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1:3 (1993). 
396. 110 Md. App. 383,677 A.2d 623 (1996). 
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defendant who actually shot the victim-but, to perform 
their public role as adjudicator, they are empowered to de-
clare, from the evidence presented to them, what is fact, 
and, based upon those declarations, whether implicit or ex-
plicit, to enter judgments.397 
What is relevant to admissibility is the credibility and apparent 
sincerity of the out-of-court declarant-in the case of tender years 
hearsay, the child. The child's motive to lie, if any, is relevant to the 
trial judge's screening function. If the judge admits the statement, it 
may be desirable to give a jury instruction like that set forth in the 
Colorado and Arkansas statutes when tender years hearsay has been 
admitted: 
If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section the 
Court shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to deter-
mine the weight and credit to be given the statement and 
that, in making the determination, it shall consider the age 
and maturity of the child, the nature of the statement, the 
circumstances under which the statement was made, and 
any other relevant factors. 398 
VIII. ADDITION TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 
For purposes of predictability, stability, and accessibility, the 
tender years hearsay exception should be added to the Maryland 
Rules of Evidence in order to guarantee Maryland's children a reason-
able opportunity to have their complaints of abuse heard, at least by 
a judge who will screen out what the judge finds insufficiently relia-
ble. For purposes of consistency, the tender years hearsay exception 
should be included in Maryland Rule 5-803, along with all of the 
other hearsay exceptions that apply regardless whether the declar-
ant is available or unavailable to testify. 
Although the judicial branch is not immune to the vicissitudes 
of voting blocks, it is less vulnerable to lobbying by self-interest 
groups than is the legislature. Children do not vote. MSTA mem-
bers do. Even though teachers are tangential to the big picture of 
child abuse, MSTA manages to wield a disproportionate power on 
this subject in the Maryland General Assembly. The danger in this 
reality is that the child and teacher may, in some instances, have di-
verging interests. 
397. [d. at 387-88, 677 A.2d at 624-25. 
398. ARK. R EVID. 803 (25)(A); accord COLO. R EVID. 803(4). 
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A number of other states have placed their tender years excel' 
tions in their rules of evidence. Thirty-eight states other than Mary-
land have specific tender years exceptions. Of these, eight are in-
cluded in the states' rules of evidence.399 The remaining thirty states 
have statutory tender years exceptions.4OO Placing the tender years 
exception in the rules of evidence makes eminent sense from the 
standpoint of accessibility for lawyers and judges. 
In a letter to Chief Judge Joseph Murphy, Delegate Vallario 
asked. the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
for its input on changes to the tender years statute and relevant pol-
icy considerations, including "whether there should be an elimina-
tion of the list of persons permitted to testify and whether an elimi-
nation of the list should result in any requirement that the child 
testify or be found unavailable, as proposed by the Maryland State 
Teachers' Association. "401 As of this writing, the committee has 
before it a proposal by Chairman Chief Judge Joseph Murphy, al' 
proved by the subcommittee on evidence, to amend Maryland Rule 
5-803 by adding subsection (25), which would provide: 
399. See ARK. R EVID. 803(25); HAw. R EVID. 804(b)(6); MICH. R. EVID. 803A; MISS. 
R EVID. 803(25); NJ. R EVID. 803(27); N.D. R EVID. 803(24); OHIO REv. CODE 
ANN. EVID. 807 (Banks-Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1996); VT. R EVID. 804a(a). 
400. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1995); ALAsKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Michie 1995); ARIz. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (West 1989); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1995); 
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513 
(1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(22) (West 1979 & Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 24-3-16 (1995); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024 (1997); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/ 
115-10 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Michie 1994 & 
Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.96 (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 6Q.460(dd) (1994 & Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1 
(1995); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 81 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075 (West 1996); NEV. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 51.385 (Michie 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:25-a (Supp. 
1995); NY FAM. CT. ACT § 1046 (McKinney 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 
§ 2803.1 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985.1 (West 
Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-69 (1994); S.c. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law 
Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. CODmED LAws § 19-16-38 (Michie 1995); TEX. CODE 
CRIM. P. ANN. art. 38.072 (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 
(1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:2 (Michie 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. 
§ 9A.44-120 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998). 
401. Letter from Delegate Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., Chairman of the Maryland House 
of Delegates Judiciary Committee, to The Honorable Joseph F. Murphy, Chief 
Judge of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals (Aug. 21, 1997) (on file with 
author). 
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The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even 
though the declarant is available as a witness: 
(25) Statements Concerning Assaultive Behavior 
A statement concerning assaultive behavior to which the de-
clarant was subjected, if the court determines that the time, 
content, and circumstances of the statement provide suffi-
cient indicia of reliability. A statement is admissible under 
this subsection only if: (A) at the time the statement was 
made, the declarant was (i) under the age of 12 years or 
(ii) chronologically 12 years or older, but had a mental or 
developmental age of under 12, because of mental retarda-
tion or developmental disability, as defined in Code, 
Health-General Article, §§ 7-101 (1) and 7-101 (e); (B) the 
proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse 
party, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to pro-
vide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to 
meet it, the intention to offer the statement and the partic-
ulars of it, including the name and address of the declar-
ant; and (C) the court makes a finding on the records as to 
each of the following specific indicia of reliability that are 
present or absent: 
(i) the declarant's personal knowledge of the event, 
(ii) any apparent motive or lack of motive to fabricate 
or exhibit partiality by the declarant, 
(iii) any apparent motive or lack of motive to fabricate 
or exhibit partiality by the witness to whom the state-
ment was made, 
(iv)whether the statement was spontaneous, 
(v)the timing of the statement, 
(vi)the content of the statement, 
Committee note: This factor includes, for example, whether 
the declarant's young age makes it unlikely that the declar-
ant fabricated the statement that represents a graphic, de-
tailed account beyond an unabused declarant's knowledge 
and experience and the appropriateness of the terminology 
to the declarant's age. 
(vii) the nature and duration of the alleged assaultive 
behavior, 
(viii) the inner consistency and coherence of the 
statement, 
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(ix) whether the declarant was suffering pain or dis-
tress when making the statement, 
(x) whether the substance of the statement was sug-
gested by the use of leading questions, and 
(xi) whether the witness to whom the statement was 
made is one to whom the declarant normally would 
turn for protection, solace, or advice. 
Committee note: Subsection (b) (25) of this Rule does not 
limit the admission of an offered statement under any other 
applicable hearsay exception or law. In this subsection, mo-
tive includes interest, bias, corruption, and coercion. 
In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), a majority of the Su-
preme Court held that, in determining the admissibility of a 
child victim's hearsay statement, the court may not consider 
corroborating evidence. 
Reporter's Note 
The proposed amendments to Rule 5-803 add two catego-
ries to the list of types of hearsay that are not excluded by 
the hearsay rule even though the declarant is available as a 
witness. 
The second proposed new subsection is subsection 
(b) (25), Statements Concerning Assaultive Behavior, a 
"tender years exception" to the hearsay rule, applicable in 
both civil and criminal proceedings. Subject to safeguards 
to keep unreliable statements out of evidence, subsection 
(b) (25) allows admission of a child's out-<>f-court statement 
concerning assaultive behavior to which the child was sub-
jected. For a statement to be admissible under this subsec-
tion, (1) the statement must have been made by a person 
with a chronological or mental age of under 12 years at the 
time the statement was made, (2) the proponent of the 
statement must have given an advance notice similar to the 
advance notice requirement set forth in subsection (b) (24) 
of this Rule, and (3) the court must determine that the 
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide 
sufficient indicia of reliability and must make a specific 
finding on the record as to each indicia of reliability, based 
upon the list set out at pp. 43-44 of the October 6, 1997 
memorandum of Professor Lynn McLain, with the addition 
of subsection (b) (25) (c) (iii), concerning motive or lack of 
93 
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motive to fabricate or exhibit partiality by the witness. Also, 
with respect to the "tender years exception," the Subcom-
mittee recommends that concurrent legislative changes be 
made to Code, Article 27, Section 775.402 
Chief Judge Murphy recommended that the legislature make 
consistent changes in the statutory evidence law. His proposal 
should be embraced by the Standing Committee on Rules and Pro-
cedure and forwarded to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Over ten years of illogically hamstringing Maryland's tender 
years hearsay exception is too many. The exception must be broad-
ened so as to permit a trial judge to at least consider a child's re-
ports of physical or sexual abuse, in both civil and criminal cases, so 
as to screen and admit the reports if reliable. 
Maryland's current restrictions-to criminal and juvenile cases, 
to certain occupations of people who can testify to a child's state-
ment, and the sui generis provision that the defense may depose 
such witnesses-serve only as artificial, illogical barriers to the pro-
tection of children who cannot protect themselves. In order to ef-
fectively serve the purpose of the tender years exception, these re-
strictions must be removed. 
The tender years exception must be extended both to other 
children who witness the alleged abuse of the child victim and to 
vulnerable adults who have the developmental age of young chil-
dren. Finally, the tender years hearsay exception should be codified 
in the Maryland Rules of Evidence, where it will be less vulnerable to 
lobbying by such groups as MSTA. 
402. Proposed MD. RULE 5-803(25) (on file with author). 
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APPENDIX 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (1997), amended by H.D. 590 (Md. 
1998); S. 688 (Md. 1998):403 
§ 775. Out of court statements of child abuse victims. 
(a) Statement defined. - In this section "statement" means: 
(1) An oral or written assertion; or 
(2) Nonverbal conduct, if it is intended as an assertion, includ-
ing sounds, gestures, demonstrations, drawings, or similar 
actions. 
(b) Admissibility - In general. -
(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of this 
subsection, if a court finds that the requirements of subsec-
tion (c) of this section are satisfied, a court may admit into 
evidence in a juvenile court proceeding or in a criminal 
proceeding an out of court statement, to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted in the statement, made by a child vic-
tim under the age of 12 years, who is the alleged victim or 
the child alleged to need assistance in the case before the 
court, concerning an alleged offense against the child of: 
(i) Child abuse, as defined in § 35C of this article; 
(ii) Rape or sexual offense, as defined in §§ 462 through 
464B of this article; 
(iii) Attempted rape or attempted sexual offense in the 
first or second degree, as defined in § 464F of this 
Article; or 
(iv) In a juvenile court proceeding, abuse or neglect as 
defined in § 5-701 of the Family Law Article. 
(2) An out of court statement may be admissible under this 
section only if: 
(i) The statement was made to and is offered by: 
1. A [licensed] physicianL as defined in § 14-101 of 
the Health Occupations Article]; 
2. A [licensed] psychologistL as defined in § 18-101 
of the Health Occupations Article]; 
3. A nurse; 
4. A [licensed] social workerL as defined III § 19-
101 of the Health Occupations Article]; 
403. Amendments, which take effect October 1, 1998, are noted as follows: (1) ad-
ditions are underlined, and (2) deleted provisions are placed in [brackets]. 
Section 775, as amended, now appears in 1998 Md. Laws ch. 638 and ch. 639. 
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[4.] 5. A principal, vice principal, teacher, or school 
counselor at a public or private preschool, elemen-
tary school, or secondary school; and 
(ii) The individual described under item (i) of this para-
graph was lawfully acting in the course of the individ-
ual's profession when the statement was made. 
(3) An out of court statement may be admissible under this 
section only if the statement possesses particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness. 
(c) Same - Conditions precedent. -
(1) Under this section, an out of court statement by a child 
may come into evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted in the statement: 
(i) If the child's statement is not admissible under any 
other hearsay exception; and 
(ii) Regardless of whether the child testifies. 
(2) If the child does not testify, the child's out of court state-
ment will be admissible only if there is corroborative evi-
dence that: 
(i) The defendant in a criminal proceeding had the op-
portunity to commit the alleged offense; or 
(ii) The alleged offender in a juvenile court proceeding 
had the opportunity to commit the alleged abuse or 
neglect. 
(3) In order to provide the defendant with an opportunity to 
prepare a response to the statement, the prosecutor shall 
serve on the defendant in a criminal proceeding or on the 
alleged offender in a juvenile court proceeding and the al-
leged offender's attorney, a reasonable time before the ju-
venile court proceeding and at least 20 days before the 
criminal proceeding in which the statement is to be of-
fered into evidence, notice of; 
(i) The State's intention to introduce the statement; and 
(ii) The content of the statement. 
(4) (i) The alleged offender shall have the right to take the 
deposition of a witness who will testify under this 
section; 
(ii) Unless the State and the defendant or respondent 
agree, or the court orders otherwise, the defendant 
in a criminal proceeding shall file a notice of deposio. 
tion at least 5 days before, or in a juvenile court pro-
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ceeding within a reasonable time before, the date of 
the deposition; and 
(iii) Except where inconsistent with this paragraph, the 
provisions of Maryland Rule 4-261 shall apply to a 
deposition taken under this paragraph. 
(d) Particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. - In order to deter-
mine if a child's statement possesses particularized guarantees 
of trustworthiness under this section, the court shall consider, 
but is not limited to, the following factors: 
(1) The child's personal knowledge of the event; 
(2) The certainty that the statement was made; 
(3) Any apparent motive to fabricate or exhibit partiality by the 
child, including interest, bias, corruption, or coercion; 
(4) Whether the statement was spontaneous or directly respon-
sive to questions; 
(5) The timing of the statement; 
(6) Whether the child's young age makes it unlikely that the 
child fabricated the statement that represents a graphic, 
detailed account beyond the child's knowledge and experi-
ence and the appropriateness of the terminology to the 
child's age; 
(7) The nature and duration of the abuse; 
(8) The inner consistency and coherence of the statement; 
(9) Whether the child was suffering pain or distress when mak-
ing the statement; 
(10) Whether extrinsic evidence exists to show the defendant's 
opportunity to commit the act complained of in the 
child's statement; 
(11) Whether the statement is suggestive due to the use of 
leading questions; and 
(12) The credibility of the person testifying about the 
statement. 
(e) Role of court. - The court, in determining whether a statement 
is admissible under this section, in a hearing outside the pres-
ence of the jury, or before the juvenile court proceeding shall: 
(1) Make a finding on the record as to the specific guarantees 
of trustworthiness that are present in the statement; and 
(2) Determine the admissibility of the statement . 
. (f) In camera examination of child. -
(1) In making a determination under subsection (e) of this 
section, the court shall conduct an in camera examination 
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of a child prior to determining the admissibility of the 
statement, except where the child: 
(i) Has died; or 
(ii) Is absent from the jurisdiction for good cause shown 
or the State has been unable to procure the child's 
presence by subpoena or other reasonable means. 
(2) (i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this para-
graph, any defendant, any defendant's attorney, and 
the prosecutor shall have the right to be present when 
the court hears testimony on whether to admit into ev-
idence an out of court statement of a child under this 
section. 
(ii) If the court is required to observe or question the 
child in connection with the determination to admit 
into evidence the out of court statement: 
1. One attorney for each defendant, one attorney for 
the child, and one prosecutor shall have the right 
to be present at the in camera examination; and 
2. The judge may not permit a defendant to be pres-
ent at the in camera examination. 
(g) Construction of section. -
(1) This section may not be construed to limit the admissibility 
of a statement under any other applicable hearsay excep-
tion or rule of evidence. 
(2) This section may not be construed to prohibit the court in 
a juvenile court proceeding from hearing testimony in the 
judge's chambers. 
